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    FRANZ BRENTANO'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,
    ESPECIALLY AS FOUND IN HIS RELIGION UND
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Franz Brentano's Philosophy of Religion,
Especially as Found in his <u>Religion</u> <u>und</u> <u>Philosophie</u>

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PREFACE

The purpose of this study is to analyze Franz Brentano's philosophy of religion, especially as it is developed in the book Religion und Philosophie. The thesis of this study is that Franz Brentano developed a coherent philosophy of religion which was to a certain degree phenomenological in nature. As the following nine chapters proceed from topic to topic, attention will especially be directed to the questions of the extent to which any given aspect of Brentano's philosophy of religion is phenomenological in nature, and the extent to which it is related to other aspects of his thought so as to constitute a coherent whole.

The author would especially like to thank Professor Tyler Thompson, under whose direction the study has been carried out. He is also most grateful to Professors Robert Browning and Eliseo Vivas for their encouragement in his work, and Professors Egon Gerdes and Robert Kraft for their co-operation in meeting various academic requirements. The author would also note his appreciation for the assistance given him by the late J. C. M. Brentano.

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I. BRENTANO'S LIFE

The major facts about Franz Brentano's life are well known, and need merely to be recapitulated here. He was born on January 16, 1838, and grew up in Aschaffenburg, a village about twenty-five miles south-east of Frankfurt am Main. His university studies, which in the traditional manner of German education were pursued at several schools, involved some mathematics but were primarily devoted to philosophy. During this same period Brentano's religious concerns culminated in his ordination in the Roman Catholic Church in 1864. Two years later he became a _Privatdozent_ (equivalent to assistant professor) in philosophy at the University of Würzburg, and in 1872 Brentano was named _ausserordentlicher Professor_ (equivalent to associate professor).

The first Vatican Council met in 1869-70. It was during the preliminary discussions and the actual proceedings of this council that Franz Brentano came to his "inner break" with the Church, although he did not formally leave the Church until Good Friday, 1873. Just prior to this latter date, he resigned his professorship at Würzburg, but the following year he was named _ordentlicher Professor_ (equivalent to professor) of philosophy at the University of Vienna.

Brentano married Ida Lieben in 1880. Since he had formerly been a priest, this marriage required him to resign his professorship, but he subsequently resumed the status of

Privatdozent. A son was born, but Brentano's wife died in 1894. He left Vienna the following year, and after some travel settled in Florence, Italy. Here he married Emilie Rueprecht.

The scholar's eyesight began to deteriorate during the later years of his life, and finally failed altogether. Franz Brentano died on March 17, 1917.

Even this cursory review of Brentano's life shows that philosophical scholarship and religious matters were concurrent and indeed interwoven concerns of his from the very beginning of his career. The following considerations will show that these two concerns of his formed the background for the essays published in Religion und Philosophie, which were written during the last two decades of his life. Brentano's break with the Church had occurred more than a quarter of a century before the first essay in this collection was written. Nevertheless, by the time that the break had reached its culmination, Brentano had formed many of the attitudes and positions later to be expressed in these essays.

Franz Brentano's stance vis-a-vis religion could be called philosophically critical, if one remembers that the critical attitude correctly understood involves an awareness of the positive as well as the negative. Brentano attained to such a position. Having made a break with the Church on philosophical grounds, he was still able to appreciate the

merit which he perceived in institutionalized religion as
seen from his philosophical perspective. This ability to
recognize both the good and the bad is an intellectual virtue
often lacking in both those persons who would attack religion
and those who would defend it. Brentano's ability to avoid
black-and-white thinking, and his capacity to acknowledge
both the positive and the negative, can be adduced among his
qualifications as a philosophical critic of religion.

1. Brentano's Early Religious Interests

Franz Brentano was reared in a home where religion was
a matter of vital concern. His father, Christian Brentano,
was a noted Catholic writer of his time, and religious themes
also appear in the works of his uncle, Clemens Brentano, a
yet more distinguished German author. Franz Brentano's mother
was by the testimony of those who knew her a very devout woman,
who daily attended early morning mass at a church some distance
from her home. While pursuing his university studies, Franz
Brentano remained under the influence of family friends for
whom, too, religion was a matter of real importance.

During the years between his habilitation at Würzburg
and his inner break with the Church, Brentano was already
interested in various issues in the philosophy of religion.
These were particularly the proofs for the existence of God,
and teleology. He also delivered a series of twenty-eight
lectures on the question of immortality.

Franz Brentano had entertained serious doubts about the Christian faith prior to his break with the Church at the time of the Vatican Council. The first doubts arose when he was only seventeen years old, and were occasioned by the problem of determinism (which had also troubled his father).

The two most serious issues which troubled him involved the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation, on the one hand, and the Church's doctrine of faith on the other. An indication of how greatly these problems had come to bother Brentano by early 1870 is to be found in Carl Stumpf's reminiscences of him, where he describes how Brentano came to him on April 29th to discuss his misgivings about the doctrines of the Trinity and incarnation, and again on May 3rd to talk about the doctrine of faith.[1]

A remark by Professor Kastil suggests that perhaps these two issues were inter-related in Brentano's mind.[2] It was a duty of the Catholic to be as free from doubt concerning the dogmas of the Chruch as he would be in the case of proven truths, states Kastil. The strategy of apologetics, he continues, was to show that these dogmas were free of contradictions. Yet this was most likely the problem with the doctrines

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[1]Carl Stumpf, "Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano" in Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seine Lehre, ed. by Oskar Kraus (München: C.H. Beck, 1919), p. 110.

[2]Alfred Kastil, Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos: Eine Einführung in seine Lehre (Bern: A. Francke, 1951), p. 11.

of the Trinity and incarnation which Brentano had found to be insoluble in his discussion with Stumpf. It appeared to Brentano that there were internal contradictions in these doctrines. Apologetic efforts to resolve these contradictions seemed to him to be verbal distinctions without conceptual differences, Kastil continues. Thus Brentano concluded that these were real, not ostensible contradictions.

It must be said to Brentano's credit, even by those who hold different estimations of the doctrines involved, that he rejected these teachings of the Church only after serious and protracted examination of them. Stumpf praises him for having rejected these doctrines only after years of struggling with them, and for subsequently reviewing again and again his line of reasoning and seeking some way out.[3] Brentano even withdrew to the cloister of St. Boniface in Munich for a time, in order to reflect on these problems of faith. The specific theological difficulties in the doctrines of the Trinity and incarnation do not appear in Religion und Philosophie, but the Church's doctrine of faith is discussed here in two respects. First, Brentano does devote considerable attention to the doctrine of one's duty to believe, and secondly, he also mentions the problem of internal contradiction within a doctrine.

The Vatican Council defined and promulgated the doctrine

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[3]Stumpf, loc. cit., p. 111.

of papal infallibility in July, 1870. Yet it would be
erroneous to think that Brentano made his inner break with
the Church simply on account of this doctrine. It should be
clear from what has been said above that he was already
quite troubled about such central doctrines of Christianity
as faith, incarnation and the Trinity. Thus the doctrine of
papal infallibility ought to be looked on as no more than a
precipitating cause of his break.

This interpretation also explains why Brentano did not
turn to either the Old Catholic Church or to Protestantism,
as he might have done if the issue had been only papal infal-
libility. He had heard Döllinger in his student years, but
still did not consider the Old Catholic Church a viable alter-
native to Rome. Neither did he entertain Protestantism as an
alternative. It constituted only a "half-way house" (Halbheit)
for him, and his attitude on the question of Church affilia-
tion was "either/or."[4]

Certainly Brentano's objections had wider scope than just
the doctrine of papal infallibility, which of course divides
Catholic from Protestant. At least some of these objections
would have had equal weight against doctrines held by a greater
majority of Protestants. Yet it is possible that Brentano's

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[4]Ibid., p. 113.

customary subtle analysis of an issue into all possible alternatives was lacking at this point, and one might wonder whether he could have found a congenial atmosphere in some circles of liberal Protestantism.

The years of Brentano's life prior to 1873 were crucial to the formulation of his attitude toward religion, but one ought not to conclude therefrom that he was not also interested in philosophy. He received habilitation at the University of Würzburg in 1866, and from then until 1873 he lectured quite extensively on the history of philosophy and on metaphysics, and also delivered lectures on inductive and deductive logic.

It was also this early in his academic career that he worked out and presented in his lectures three significant aspects of his philosophical position. One of these was the characterization of the four phases which repeat themselves in the history of philosophy. Another significant accomplishment, perhaps one of those for which he is best known, was his three-fold division of the operations of the mind: Representing (_Vorstellen_), judging (_Urteilen_), and desiring (_Begehren_). Still another theme which he worked out at this time was the distinction between certainty and certitude.[5] One will note that each of these themes, which were thus

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[5]This will be discussed _infra_ in the section on Brentano's technical terminology.

intimated so early in his philosophical career, reappears in
Religion und Philosophie.

2. Brentano's Later Religious Interests

Even after Brentano resigned his orders and left the
Church in 1873, he still continued to be concerned with
religion. His friends remember him as having spoken of
Catholicism only in terms of the highest appreciation,[6] and
he expressed disapproval of the Kulturkampf which had broken
out in Germany. Before and during the Vatican Council, the
Jesuits had championed a formal declaration of papal infal-
libility, which of course was diametrically opposite to
Brentano's own position in the controversy; nevertheless, he
opposed the expulsion of the Jesuits from Germany which was
a consequence of the Kulturkampf.

Another way in which Brentano continued to reflect his
religious background was in the practice of meditation. It
was very important to him, and he continued the practice all
his life long. Carl Stumpf has said that in these hours of
meditation Brentano felt the nearness of God, and that through-
out his life he had an imperturbable trust in God.[7] Husserl
has even said that during the last years of his life, Brentano

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[6]Edmund Husserl, "Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano," in Kraus,
op. cit., p. 156.

[7]Stumpf, loc. cit., p. 142.

seemed to live half in this world and half in the next.[8]

It was during these years that Brentano wrote much of _Religion und Philosophie_. He had broken with the Church many years before, due to his criticism of certain key doctrines, and his belief in God was based on philosophical theology alone. Yet one who reads _Religion und Philosophie_ can see how very much this belief in God meant to Brentano personally. In this respect, at least, he could be called a religious man.

3. Brentano's Style of Thought

One final topic to be mentioned here might be called Brentano's "style of thought." This is the question, how did he proceed in thinking through an issue in philosophy? It is in one regard a more difficult question than it appears. There are three major sources upon which one may draw, men who intimately knew Brentano and his thought; however, several different and seemingly contradictory pictures of the philosopher emerge from their writings.

Professor Alfred Kastil presents the portrait of a thinker who maintained a certain distance between himself and his thoughts.[9] In not identifying himself with his opinions, Brentano was always free to reconsider and revise

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[8]Husserl, _loc. cit._, p. 167.

[9]Kastil, _op. cit._

his former conclusions. One gains the impression from reading
Kastil that Brentano would systematically and sympathetically
set out the arguments on both sides of an issue, arrive at
a conclusion, and then immediately move on to another issue.[10]
Brentano seemed to appreciate a difference of opinion, as the
following passage from a letter to Hugo Bergmann would indi-
cate: "The differences of opinion, of which you have had
some glimpse, might clearly show you how little we practice
blind adherence in our circle. Precisely such differences
give the occasion for the most careful new research, which
then sometimes leads to the enrichment /of knowledge/."[11]
After the passage of some time, Brentano would return to his
own solutions of prior problems, appraising them with all
objectivity and revising them where necessary.[12]

A rather ambiguous characterization of Brentano's method
of proceeding is to be found in the tribute to him by his
friend Carl Stumpf.[13] On the one hand, Stumpf records
Brentano's confession to him that in presenting his lectures
on epistemology while at Würzburg, he would set out the most
pointed objections to the possibility of knowledge, without
at that time knowing how he might answer them. He only

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[10]Ibid., pp. 13-14, 17.

[11]Ibid., p. 21, translation mine.

[12]Ibid., p. 17.

[13]Stumpf, loc. cit.

trusted that answers could be found, and worked in great tension until he was able to meet these objections and build his case.[14] Yet Stumpf also states, on the other hand, that upon hearing Brentano's disputation for habilitation at Würzburg in 1866, and also on the basis of Brentano's lectures at the university which he subsequently attended, it was evident that Brentano was lecturing and arguing on the basis of a thoroughly thought-out theory.[15]

A still different impression is to be derived from Husserl's reminiscences of Brentano.[16] Here one gets the picture of a man who, though praising freedom of thought, could not bear to have this independent thinking directed against his own convictions.[17] He remained rigid in the formulations which he had worked out, was sensitive to any deviation from them, and became agitated about any objections brought against his convictions.[18] Husserl gives one the impression that Brentano was sure of his philosophical position and possessed an inner certainty about being on the right path.[19] Husserl felt that Brentano thoroughly believed

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[14]_Ibid._, p. 100.

[15]_Ibid._, p. 88.

[16]Husserl, _loc. cit._

[17]_Ibid._, p. 161.

[18]_Ibid._, p. 160.

[19]_Ibid._

himself to be the creator of a _philosophia perennis_.[20]

These are three rather different pictures of Brentano's philosophical style, and the reader of _Religion und Philosophie_ might want to observe just how the author of this work does proceed. Two features of his method may be observed in this book. First, Brentano seems to be quite aware of different points of view on the issue he is discussing, and he is sensitive to subtle differences among the various alternatives. Second, Brentano does appear to be quite sure of himself, especially at certain points, and at times his certitude of the correctness of his position and the incorrectness of others' views may offend those readers who expect a certain degree of personal detachment and courtesy in philosophical discussion.

In summary, then, the earlier years of Franz Brentano's life constitute a background for his _Religion und Philosophie_, the various essays of which were written during his later years. He was reared in a devout Roman Catholic home, and early became interested in various issues in the philosophy of religion. Yet even before the first Vatican Council and his break with the Church at that time, Brentano began to entertain serious doubts about several major tenets of the

[20]_Ibid._, p. 158.

Christian faith, specifically the doctrines of Trinity and incarnation, and the doctrine of faith. These probably constitute the real reason he left the Church, and the doctrine of papal infallibility was only a precipitating cause. They may also explain why he did not seriously consider either the Old Catholic Church or Protestantism, but one still might wonder whether he dismissed the latter alternative too cursorily. All this time, Brentano was deeply involved in philosophy, and was lecturing regularly at Würzburg and later at Vienna. Even this early in his career, he worked out several significant theories which are subsequently reflected in Religion und Philosophie. Even after his break with the Church, Brentano still remained very much interested in religion, and had a constant awareness of the reality of God. Brentano was able to see the positive as well as negative aspects of organized religion, and his attitude is reflected in this book. Other features of his personal style of doing philosophy, also reflected here, were on the one hand his ability to appreciate all possible alternatives in approaching a particular philosophical issue, and on the other hand, perhaps an undue certitude that his solution was the correct one and other viewpoints were wrong.

II. BRENTANO'S PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY

The numerous books which bear the name Franz Brentano on the title page give one an indication of how productive this philosopher was throughout his lifetime. Many of these volumes were published during his philosophical career, of course, and some went through several editions. Still others were published posthumously. The present work, _Religion und Philosophie_, falls into this latter category.[1]

When Brentano died in 1917, he left many yet unpublished manuscripts. Among this material (his _Nachlass_), there were numerous essays on religion and philosophy, dating from the last two decades of his life. Professor Alfred Kastil did the original scholarly work on Brentano's manuscripts, and this collection of Brentano's essays was edited by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand and published in the original German by the Francke Verlag of Bern in 1954.

While it is virtually axiomatic in the scholarly world that a work can fully be understood only in the original language, there should be added the caveat that the original text can also be a source of misunderstanding for a reader whose native language is other than that in which the book was written. Accordingly, the student of Brentano's philosophy of religion will want to take note of language as a

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[1] Franz Brentano, _Religion und Philosophie_, ed. by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1954).

bearer of meaning. This chapter will first consider several German words in common usage which could be deceptive to a reader whose native language is English. The chapter will then proceed to explicate those German words to which Brentano assigns a technical meaning in the exposition of his philosophical position.

1.   Problematic Words

Since different languages do not have precisely congruent vocabularies, certain common German words can present very real problems for readers whose native language is English. Thus it is necessary to take note of these words as they are used in the exposition of Brentano's philosophy of religion.

The German word Wissenschaft has a broader meaning than the English word "science" which is often used to translate it. The former means primarily an organized body of knowledge. Thus literary criticism, for example, can be a Wissenschaft, but not a "science," in the commonly accepted uses of these words. When a native speaker of contemporary English uses the word "science," he often means by it "natural science"; however, this phrase is correctly used to translate the German word Naturwissenschaft. Yet some academic disciplines claim to be "social sciences." Such usage indicates the presence of an issue in the theory of knowledge: What is a science? This is not a new problem for epistemology, for it can be traced back to classical philosophy. Brentano, too,

held a definite conception of the nature of science, which will be explicated in a subsequent section.[2] For the present, however, one should simply note that _Wissenschaft_ is one of those German words which has a rather different meaning from its English "equivalent," and thus be on one's guard against a possible semantic misunderstanding.

There are two German words commonly used in discussions of philosophy and religion, each of which must be understood in different ways depending upon its context. The word _Lehre_ can be rendered in English by either "teaching" or "doctrine" (_inter alia_), and _Glaube_ can be translated by either "belief" or "faith," among others. A convenient rule might be to understand each word in the former way in a (so to speak) secular context, and in the latter way in religious discourse. Yet this rule has numerous exceptions, for there are times when "teaching" seems to be the intended sense of the word _Lehre_ even in a theological passage. Likewise there are instances in which "belief" appears to be the appropriate sense of _Glaube_ in a religious context, especially when the issue is a matter of the intellectual acceptance of a doctrine. What is already a difficult situation is made even worse in the case of the word _Glaube_, since there are present here both a semantic problem and a theological problem. In the light

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[2]_Infra._

of all these difficulties, the reader of Brentano's philosophy of religion should try simply to "feel" the sense of the German word in its context, and not to try to understand it through any supposed equivalence to an English term.

In several instances the reader of Brentano's works will encounter words which have a precise technical meaning as well as a general meaning. One of these is the German _typisch_, which is the adjectival form of _Typus_. The word derives ultimately from the Latin _typus_, of course, and functions as a technical term in definition theory.[3] Such a duality of meaning is also found in the German words _aktuell_ and _habituell_. These words trace back ultimately to the Latin scholastic terms _actus_ and _habitus_, and thus bear technical meanings in Brentano's text.[4]

2. Special Terms

There are several words and phrases which Brentano has used in special ways in the development of his philosophy of religion. These could be called _termini technici_, if one keeps in mind the fact that some of them bear special meanings in a particular argument but also are used with a more general meaning elsewhere in the exposition of his thought.

As Brentano develops his analysis of religious belief,

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[3] _Infra._

[4] _Infra._

he appears to be using the words <u>Sicherheit</u> and <u>Gewissheit</u>
as technical terms. In distinguishing between the degree of
reliability possessed by some given belief and the degree of
tenacity with which some person holds that belief to be true,
Brentano consistently uses the terms <u>Sicherheit</u> and <u>Gewissheit</u>,
respectively. The reader of Brentano's German text might in
his own mind relate these to the pair of English terms
"certainty" and "certitude," again respectively. In this
connection it should also be mentioned that the participle
of <u>sichern</u> might best be understood to mean "established with
certainty."

It is questionable whether either <u>Erkenntnis</u> or <u>Wissen</u>
functions as a technical term in the text. Each has a
manifold connotation, and although the words are not
synonymous, their circles of meaning do overlap. In such
cases, the reader could understand each word as meaning
"knowledge," especially since this English word likewise has
a wealth of related meanings, some more precise than others.

In certain instances it appears that <u>Wissen</u> is intended
to designate the entertainment of a correct belief together
with the ability to demonstrate its correctness, whereas
<u>Erkenntnis</u> seems to be employed for the more inclusive and
less precise common understanding of what is knowledge. Yet
in other cases it is the word <u>Erkenntnis</u> which is used with
this more precise technical meaning. One could at best look
for a tendency to prefer <u>Wissen</u> to <u>Erkenntnis</u> when there is

present in a given discussion some connotation of the
habitual aspect of knowledge. Perhaps it would be best to
say that each word generally appears in the text with the full
diversity, imprecision and ambiguity of meaning which it
bears in ordinary usage, but that in certain contexts either
word may temporarily be assigned a more precise meaning for
the sake of the analysis being conducted at the moment. Here
again is an illustration of how semantic and epistemological
concerns are inter-related.

Franz Brentano's philosophy of religion includes the
rather commonly held position that righteous persons who have
not received their reward in this life, and unrighteous
persons who have not been punished in this life, will each
obtain just recompense in the next life. Two different
phrases are used to indicate this idea, <u>vergeltende</u>
<u>Gerechtigkeit</u> and <u>gerechte Vergeltung</u>. They are used inter-
changeably, and appear to be synonymous; in fact, the only
difference between the two seems to be an interchange in the
parts of speech.

The student of Brentano's thought is now in a position
to consider philosophical issues, after this brief study of
those German terms which could prove deceptive to a reader
whose native language is not that of the original text, and
after an examination of those terms to which Brentano assigned
a technical meaning in the development of his philosophy of
religion.

III. BRENTANO AND PHENOMENOLOGY

One question immediately presents itself to the reader
of Religion und Philosophie: Is Franz Brentano doing a
phenomenology of religion in this book? This is a pertinent
question. On the one hand, he is doing a philosophy of
religion. On the other hand, Brentano was, so to speak,
the "grandfather" of the phenomenological movement. If Edmund
Husserl is to be considered the "recognized founder" of
phenomenology,[1] then one may look upon his teacher Brentano
as a "proto-phenomenologist" from whom Husserl derived
several of the principles which were to become central themes
in his philosophy.[2] Now if Brentano is developing a philosophy
of religion here, and if he is a proto-phenomenologist, then
the question naturally follows, is he doing a phenomenology
of religion?

This question is not so simple as it appears, however,
because it involves several constituent questions which must
be considered before an answer can be essayed. First, one
must inquire into the basic orientation of phenomenology, in
so far as it applies to the phenomenology of religion.

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[1]Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A
Historical Introduction (2nd ed.; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1965), I, 21.

[2]Infra.

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Second, one must then proceed to ask how Brentano anticipated phenomenology as characterized in the first inquiry. These first two questions will be taken up in the present chapter.

There is an approach within the academic study of religion entitled "phenomenology of religion." However, it would perhaps be precipitous for one to suppose, on the basis of its name alone, that this approach actually is an application of phenomenology to the study of religion. Professor Spiegelberg, for example, has some reservations about the relationship of these two disciplines.[3] Thus at the risk of sounding redundant, one will want to inquire, third, just how the phenomenology of religion can be done phenomenologically. Only after all three of these prior questions have been considered can one then profitably ask, fourth, whether and in what way Franz Brentano's philosophy of religion is a phenomenology of religion. These latter two questions will be considered in the next chapter.

Furthermore, what is already a complex procedure becomes even more intricate through the possibility that various representative figures of a given movement such as phenomenology might characterize their school of thought in ways which would differ from one another in accidental or perhaps even essential respects.

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Spiegelberg, op. cit., n. 5, pp. 10-11.

1. Characterization of Phenomenology

Two particular texts will be used to present such a characterization of phenomenology as would apply to the question under consideration. These texts are chosen first because they represent the thought of two major phenomenologists, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and second because certain contemporary phenomenologists of religion consider these texts to be paradigmatic for their own procedures.

An examination of each text will show that phenomenology, as conceived by the author of the text, involves a relationship between the two poles of self and world, however this relationship might be characterized in a given context. This duality might be spoken of as the relationship of consciousness and object of consciousness, or inner and outer, or intentional consciousness and constituted world, or noesis and noemata. Regardless of how this polarity might be characterized in any given case--and the several pairings above need not be taken as precisely synonymous-- the point to be noted is that for phenomenology the one correlate is not to be considered without the other. Consciousness is consciousness of an object, and an object is the object of consciousness.

The selection of Edmund Husserl's Cartesian Meditations[4]

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[4]Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. by Dorian Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).

has two features to commend it. The book represents the mature thought of the "recognized founder" of the phenomenological movement, and it is also the text on which Professor Jurji bases his own phenomenology of religion.[5]

It is clear from the very first that Husserl will not allow the world to retain the status which it has for the uncritical standpoint of "naive Objectivism."[6] With Descartes, he takes the "radical turn";[7] that is to say, he goes to the root (L. radix, radicis) of the matter, which is "transcendental subjectivism."[8] The existence of the world is not evident apodictically,[9] and the question presents itself whether there is not something prior to the world which is the basis for its existence.[10] There is, Husserl answers, and this basis is the ego cogito.[11] The basis of the objective is the subjective, and Husserl employs the phenomenological epoché to disclose transcendental experience.[12] What Husserl is

[5]Edward J. Jurji, The Phenomenology of Religion (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), p. 3.

[6]Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 4.

[7]Ibid., p. 5.

[8]Ibid., p. 4.

[9]Ibid., p. 17.

[10]Ibid., p. 18.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid., p. 27.

doing, then, is to suspend judgment about the existence of the world,[13] in order to go back to its root in the ego. This is the move from the objective, which is transcendent (in regard to consciousness), to the subjective, which is transcendental (in reference to the world).

The turn from objectivity to subjectivity has been so radical that Husserl sometimes appears simply to have replaced the one pole by the other. For example, he states at one point that the phenomenology of self-constitution coincides with phenomenology as a whole.[14] Yet this must be understood in context. He is speaking of the act of reflexion, wherein the self is given to the self, as itself. The constituted ego itself has a world which exists for it, and in this world, objects which exist for it. Thus if phenomenology does focus on the self, and the self alone, still its result is the discovery that the self has a world, i.e. that consciousness is intentional.

There are other points at which Husserl more carefully balances the two poles of ego and world. For example, he acknowledges "the two correlative sides," which are modes of consciousness, on the one hand, and the intentional object,

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[13] The Greek ἐποχή means "suspension" (of judgment).

[14] Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 68.

on the other.[15] This means that there are two lines of phenomenological description, <u>noetic</u> and <u>noematic</u>, the one of which is counterpart of the other.[16]

Still, Husserl places his emphasis upon the subjective, for the ego has objects only as intentional correlates of the consciousness of them.[17]

Husserl's phenomenology may be compared and contrasted on this issue with that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The basis of this comparison will be the "Preface" an essay in its own right which has been prefixed to the text of one of his major works.[18] This essay has been selected first because it is such an excellent statement of Merleau-Ponty's conception of phenomenology, and secondly because it was chosen to represent this philosophical movement in a recent anthology on the phenomenology of religion.[19]

Two features of Merleau-Ponty's conception of phenomenology should be noted in the context of this discussion. First, he

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[15]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 36.

[16]<u>Ibid</u>.

[17]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 37.

[18]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u>, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962).

[19]Joseph Dabney Bettis, ed., <u>Phenomenology of Religion: Eight Modern Descriptions of the Essence of Religion</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 5-30.

places his emphasis on the world, not the ego. Second, he still retains the basic phenomenological duality of subject and object. In other words, Merleau-Ponty relocates the emphasis within the same fundamental framework.

It has been noted above that Husserl grants primary status to the ego pole of the phenomenological duality. Merleau-Ponty, in contrast, accords much more significance to the other pole. Husserl would introduce the phenomenological reduction, in order to bracket out of consideration the question of the existence of the world. Merleau-Ponty, on the contrary, holds that a complete reduction is impossible.[20] The reason for this, it appears, is that the world is already present before any prior analysis of it.[21] It is, in other words, something already given to the subject, and the phenomenologist must take it into account. Now the Husserlian phenomenology does not disregard the world altogether, of course, but it does accord it a derived status in the sense that the ego is focussed upon, and only afterwards is the world discovered as what has been constituted by the ego. Even then, the method of the _Cartesian_ _Meditations_ requires transcendental intersubjectivity as a prior step before the world can attain its full status in the phenomenological

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[20] Merleau-Ponty, _op_. _cit_., p. xiv.

[21] _Ibid_., p. x.

scheme of things.[22] Merleau-Ponty, however, holds that the
world is to be described, not constructed.[23] He can take
this approach because the very givenness of the world will
not allow it to be "reduced," i. e., "bracketed" in the
first place. The meaning of the world (_qua_ world, of course)
is rather the world's facticity for us.[24] One could extra-
polate from this remark to say that a "reduced world," i. e.,
a world whose existence is bracketed out of consideration, is
a contradiction in terms, for the world is what _is_.

Now although Merleau-Ponty places his emphasis on the
givenness of the world, rather than on the transcendentality
of the ego, he nevertheless continues to affirm the duality
of ego and world. The true _cogito_ (in contrast with the
cogito of Descartes and Husserl) recognizes both one's thought,
as factual, and the world, as indubitable.[25] The emphasis is
on the latter element, of course, in contradistinction to the
Cartesian _cogito_, but the result is an affirmation of both
poles of the duality. What is discovered is a "being-in-the-

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[22]Husserl, _Cartesian_ _Meditations_, Fifth Meditation.

[23]Merleau-Ponty, _loc_. _cit_.

[24]_Ibid_., p. xv.

[25]_Ibid_., p. xiii.

world" (être-au-monde).[26]   Contrary to the doctrine of those
whom he terms sensationalists, i.e., those who hold that what
we perceive are our states of consciousness and who accordingly
doubt whether we really do perceive a world, Merleau-Ponty
asserts that the world is what we perceive.[27] Again the
emphasis is on the latter element, but perception and world
are combined in a duality. Thus Merleau-Ponty can say in
summarizing the presentation of his method that the chief
gain of phenomenology is to have united extreme subjectivism
and extreme objectivism.[28]

This section of the argument has undertaken to charac-
terize the nature of phenomenology, in respect to the issues
under discussion, by reference to two carefully selected
representative texts. It has been found that a crucial
element of phenomenology is the recognition of a duality of
consciousness and object of consciousness. In Husserl the
emphasis appears to fall upon the subjective pole, and in
Merleau-Ponty it seems to be located in the objective pole.
Yet what is common to each is their recognition of the
duality of transcendental experience and transcendent world.

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[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid., p. xvi.

[28]Ibid., p. xix.

2.   Brentano and Phenomenology.

The preceding section drew upon key works of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in order to elucidate the nature of phenomenology, in so far as this has implications for a characterization of the phenomenology of religion. The present section will go on to suggest the way in which Brentano himself anticipated the phenomenological movement. He himself did not claim to be a phenomenologist, but Husserl studied under him in Vienna and called him "my one and only teacher in philosophy."[29] Considering this, one may justifiably call Brentano a "proto-phenomenologist," for there are at least three concepts of his which have become principal themes of phenomenology. The first of these is Brentano's definition of consciousness, and the second, closely related to it, is the principle of the intentionality of consciousness. The third concept, which is based on the first two, is that of the reflexivity of consciousness. These themes are to be found at various places in Brentano's writings, including Religion und Philosophie. Since this latter work is the primary concern here, it will serve as the source of these themes. They are chiefly reflected in Husserl's thought, and since the Cartesian Meditations has already been chosen to represent his phenomenological position, this section will show how Brentano's ideas reappear there.

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[29]Spiegelberg, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

Part Four of <u>Religion</u> <u>und</u> <u>Philosophie</u> begins with a discussion of the concepts of the physical and mental, that is to say, matter and mind. Having characterized the former as what is qualitative and localized, Brentano turns to the latter. It is not adequate to characterize the mental negatively--as that which lacks the features of the physical-- but rather one must give it a positive characterization, he states.[30] Brentano has set for himself an ambitious project, in as much as some thinkers have even held consciousness to be a primitive concept, incapable of definition.[31] Descartes was able to characterize the mind as "a thinking thing" (<u>res</u> <u>cogitans</u>), in contradistinction to matter, which is extended (<u>res</u> <u>extensa</u>).[32] Brentano goes further and proposes as a determination (i. e., characterization) of the mental: "having something for an object" (<u>etwas</u> <u>zum</u> <u>Gegenstand</u> <u>haben</u>).[33] This is quite an accomplishment. Brentano has recognized that consciousness is an elementary concept, i. e., a concept which can be elucidated only through examples.[34] Nevertheless he

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[30]Brentano, <u>Religion</u> <u>und</u> <u>Philosophie</u>, p. 190.

[31]Eg. Sir William Hamilton, in <u>Lectures</u> <u>on</u> <u>Metaphysics</u>, quoted by Ledger Wood in "Consciousness," <u>The</u> <u>Dictionary</u> <u>of</u> <u>Philosophy</u>, ed. by Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1942), p. 64.

[32]Rene Descartes, <u>Principles</u> <u>of</u> <u>Philosophy</u>, Principle LIII, in The Philosophical <u>Works</u> <u>of</u> <u>Descartes</u>, trans. by E.S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), I, 240-241.

[33]Brentano, <u>Religion</u> <u>und</u> <u>Philosophie</u>, <u>loc</u>. <u>cit</u>.

[34]<u>Ibid</u>.

does not allow his analysis to stop at that point. He continues on by inquiring what it is that all examples of conscious activity possess in common, and is further possessed by nothing else. This is the feature of having something for an object, he concludes.

Brentano's characterization of the mental is reflected in the _Cartesian Meditations_. Husserl states that "...⁄the⁊ universal fundamental property of consciousness" is "to be consciousness _of_ something..." (emphasis his).[35] That is to say, it is of the very essence of consciousness (or, in other words, its universal fundamental property is) that consciousness has something for an object. This characterization of consciousness, derived from Brentano, is crucial to Husserl's phenomenology, since it is the basis for the relationship of _cogito_ and _cogitatum_, transcendental subjectivity and transcendent objectivity. This fact can be seen even more clearly in terms of the principle of intentionality, which follows.

After having given a characterization of the nature of the mental, Brentano then proceeds to exfoliate this definition. There are many different sorts of mental acts, and each of these is structired according to the basic feature of consciousness. Each in its own way has something for an object. Seeing,

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[35]Husserl, _Cartesian Meditations_, p. 33.

for example, is one kind of mental act. But we do not simply see, we see something.[36] In terms of his prior analysis of matter, Brentano thinks of this as something colored. Thus seeing is having something colored for an object. This analysis is not restricted to external perception, either, but applies to all kinds of mental acts. Thus believing is believing in something, and loving is loving something. This relationship of thinking to the object of thought is called "intentionality" in phenomenological writing; the term "intentional relation" (die intentionale Beziehung) can also be traced back to Brentano.[37]

The concept of intentionality is also a major theme for Husserl. He calls it "a fundamental property of...psychic life,"[38] and states that intentionality is the property of consciousness of being consciousness of something.[39] Husserl was ambivalent about giving credit to Brentano for the discovery of intentionality. At one point in the manuscript of Cartesian Meditations he acknowledged that he was following Brentano in recognizing intentionality, but then, according to Dorion Cairn's note on the translated text, he subsequently

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[36]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, loc. cit.

[37]Ibid., p. 191.

[38]Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 82.

[39]Ibid., p. 33.

crossed out the attribution.[40] Later in the work Husserl

again referred to Brentano's concept of intentionality, but

immediately qualified this acknowledgment by remarking that

it was inadequate for "intentional analysis."[41]

A third aspect of Brentano's thought which has come to

play a significant role in subsequent phenomenological thought

is that which is often informally called "reflection."[42]

Continuing his discussion in Part Four of _Religion und_

Philosophie, Brentano states that our consciousness of some-

thing is always also a consciousness of itself.[43] For example,

seeing has the colored for its object, and what could be

called a reflexive act of consciousness has seeing-the-colored

for its object. The former is the "external" object, and the

latter the "internal" object. This principle too is based on

the concept of intentionality and thus ultimately on the

fundamental characterization of mind, for it involves the

relationship of consciousness to its object.

The principle of reflection reappears in Husserl's thought.

As Brentano has done in Part Four of _Religion und Philosophie,_

so too in the Second Meditation of his _Cartesian_ _Meditations_

Husserl moves from a recognition of intentionality to the

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[40]_Ibid._, p. 82.

[41]_Ibid._, p. 143.

[42]This would be phrased better as "reflection," or "the
reflexivity of consciousness."

[43]Brentano, _Religion und Philosophie,_ _loc._ _cit._

principle of reflection. In "perceiving straightforwardly,"
he states, we direct ourselves to the house; in reflection we
direct ourselves to perceiving directed to the house.[44] The
concept of reflection is not merely an incidental insight for
Husserl; it is instead an essential element in his phenomeno-
logy. The reason for this is that following the phenomenolo-
gical reduction, attention is diverted away from the world as
existing, and is redirected _reflectively_ to intentional
consciousness of the world. Thus Husserl can say that
"...the phenomenology of self-constitution coincides with
phenomenology as a whole."[45] What this means is that the
self is constituted as an ego constituting a world. It is
a disclosure of reflection, and retains the world as the
primary object of consciousness while making this consciousness
itself the secondary object.

Although these three principles can be traced from
Brentano to Husserl, one could still expect the latter
philosopher to have elaborated and perhaps even modified that
which he derived from the former. In fact, Professor
Spiegelberg makes this case in his history of the phenomeno-
logical movement.[46] These modifications, while significant,
are not relevant to the case which is being argued here,

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[44]Husserl, _Cartesian Meditations_, p. 33.

[45]_Ibid._, p. 68.

[46]Spiegelberg, _op._ _cit._, pp. 107-11.

however--that Brentano did make a major contribution to phenomenology, namely the principle of the intentionality of consciousness.

This chapter has undertaken to argue two points. First, it has proposed that a significant aspect of phenomenology is its maintaining a relationship between subject and object, so that neither correlate, neither consciousness nor object of consciousness, can adequately be considered without reference to the other. The evidence for this has been derived from two significant presentations of phenomenology, one by Edmund Husserl and the other by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Secondly, this chapter has also argued that Franz Brentano anticipated the phenomenological movement in one very important respect, namely the principle of the intentionality of consciousness. The method of proof for this assertion has been a comparison of the present book with the same work of Husserl's which was used for the previous argument.

IV. BRENTANO AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION

The previous chapter undertook to characterize the nature
of phencmenology, and to show how Franz Brentano prefigured
this philosophical movement. This chapter will go on to
characterize the phenomenology of religion, and to show how
this method has been applied by Brentano, Rudolf Otto, and
Henry Duméry.

1.   Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Religion

It has already been remarked that there is some uncer-
tainty whether that academic undertaking denominated "the
phenomenology of religion" can legitimately be considered to
be a particular aspect of the philosophical endeavor called
phenomenology.[1] The study has progressed sufficiently at
this point to suggest a resolution of the issue.

There is a certain degree of vagueness, or even ambiguity
about precisely what the phenomenology of religion is. Thus
Professor Bettis can remark that the phrase "phenomenology of
religion" has three meanings, ranging from quite rigorous
to rather casual.[2] The terminological problem may even be
traceable all the way back to the term "phenomenon," which
itself has carried a number of meanings in the history of
philosophy. The word "phenomenon" ($\phi\alpha\iota\nu o\mu\epsilon\nu o\nu$) may be

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[1]<u>Supra</u>.

[2]Bettis, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 1-2.

defined etymologically as "that which appears."[3] If one
relies upon this non-technical meaning of the word, then one
could speak of anything which appears in history as an
historical phenomenon, whether it be a single occurrence
(e. g., the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B. C.), a
continuity (e. g., the Democratic Party), or a general
pattern (e. g., the military as an arm of the state). Accor-
dingly, any given religion would be an historical phenomenon
(as a continuity), and so would religion in general (as a
pattern).

If a scholar were to accept such a general and non-
technical meaning of the word "phenomenon," then he would
consider "phenomenology" to mean simply the study of what
appears. Since religion appears in history, it is a phenomenon,
and thus "the phenomenology of religion" would designate the
study of religion as it appears in history. A scholar who
employs his terminology in this way might understand his study
of any given religion as an historical continuity (e. g.,
Islam) or his study of many religions from this point of view,
to be a phenomenology of religion. Or he might reserve the
term "phenomenology of religion" for the study of recurring
patterns in the historical religions (e. g., worship).

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[3]Even this definition is not so precise as might be desired.
The word φαινω and its derivative forms have many fine shades
of meaning, as can be noted in Henry George Liddell and Robert
Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (9th ed.; Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, n.d.), II, 1912-13.

The term "phenomenology of religion," when taken in the above manner, is so imprecise that it is misapplied to certain other academic concerns, on the one hand, and it still does not qualify as an aspect of phenomenology, on the other hand. The study of a given religion as an historical continuity, or of several such historical continuities each considered in its own right, is a significant and well-developed academic undertaking.[4] This approach is sometimes called, vaguely, "world religions," or misleadingly "comparative religion." A more appropriate name for this study might have been "the history of religion," if the term die religiongeschichtliche Schule had not already been pre-empted by a particular school of scholarship. At any rate, this is an established field of study in its own right, even though the name "phenomenology of religion" does not apply to it for reasons presently to be noted. Likewise the study of recurring patterns among the various religions is also a significant and well-developed academic undertaking.[5] It may more appropriately be termed "comparative religion," for it does in fact compare one religion

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[4]An excellent presentation of this approach is John B. Noss, Man's Religions, Revised Edition (New York: Macmillan, 1956).

[5]An excellent example of this approach is G. van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, trans. by J.E. Turner (2 vols.; New York: Harper & Row, 1963). Jurji (op. cit.) is a combination of these two approaches, since it considers each historical religion in turn, but examines it in terms of recurring patterns.

with another in order to discover common elements, variations within similarities, and (one might add) uniquenesses. Each of these two approaches to religion is a legitimate academic undertaking in its own right. Yet neither of them could justifiably be called "the phenomenology of religion," if this term is used with a precise meaning. The reason for this conclusion follows from the previous characterization of phenomenology.

In order for any given study to be a phenomenological study, it must essentially investigate the inter-relationship between the subjective and objective poles of that which it studies. That is to say, the objective pole must be examined in terms of its relationship to the subjective pole,[6] if the study is to be considered phenomenological. The reason for this requirement is to be found in the nature of phenomenology, as it was characterized in the previous chapter.[7] Husserl, with Descartes, makes the "radical turn" from the objective to the subjective, as has been pointed out already. Nevertheless, he still does not simply replace the one pole with the other, for he discovers that the self has a world which it constitutes. Husserl differs from Merleau-Ponty in that the one places his emphasis on the self, while the other stresses the world. The world is already present and given

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[6]And vice versa, of course.

[7]Supra.

to the ego, for Merleau-Ponty. Yet each of these two phenomenologists agrees on the main point, namely the duality of self and world. It is this principle which is crucial to phenomenology, and which must be central to any study in order for that investigation to be a phenomenological study.

Once this fundamental principle is acknowledged, it becomes clear why the approaches previously mentioned do not qualify as phenomenology of religion.[8] Neither is based on the duality of self and world. On the contrary, each is usually restricted to an examination of the world, specifically that aspect of the world which is called religion. If either study does introduce the principle of duality, it does so only incidentally. If one particular religion is studied as an historical continuity, it is studied as one part of the world. If patterns among religions are identified, they are recognized as patterns common to various parts of the world. The world is described, but not the self, and there is lacking most especially any recognition of the relation of self and world. It is for this reason that such approaches, while legitimate and valuable in themselves, are not to be considered the phenomenology of religion.

Conversely, the phenomenology of religion is an academic undertaking based on the principle of duality. It studies

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[8]_Supra._

religion in terms of the relationship of self and world. This relation is of course the fundamental insight of phenomenology. What is involved here is a recognition of the intentionality of consciousness. There is an interiority, the interiority of consciousness, which is directed outward.[9] Consciousness has an object. It is in this sense of self and world that the principle of duality is to be understood. The self is not merely one observable unit whose relation to the other observable units is to be described. The self cannot be reached at all in this way; one part of the world is mistaken for the self. Phenomenology, in contrast, has shown the self to be an intentional consciousness, directed toward the world. Consequently, the phenomenology of religion is that study of religion which is based upon the principle of the duality of self and world (phenomenologically understood).

2. Otto, Brentano, and the Phenomenology of Religion

If the term "phenomenology of religion" is given this more rigorous definition, one might naturally ask whether there are any scholarly studies to which the term might then be justifiably applied. The answer is affirmative, and two illustrations of this approach can be found in the works of Rudolf Otto and Franz Brentano.

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[9]These spatial terms are, of course, metaphorical language.

Otto's most famous work, <u>The Idea of the Holy</u>,[10] can legitimately be considered an instance of the phenomenology of religion. The reason is that the book makes the recognition of a duality of self and world an essential feature of its approach to the subject matter. The self-appointed task of the book is to characterize the holy (<u>das Heilige</u>). Its result can be recapitualted in the Latin statement <u>numen</u> (<u>est</u>) <u>mysterium tremendum et fascinans</u>. This is fundamentally a phenomenological approach, because the holy (<u>numen</u>) is characterized in terms of the self-world relationship. This can be seen from each term in the definition.

Otto makes quite clear that he will study the holy on the basis of man's experience of it. The nature of the numinous (i. e., that which is holy) can be discovered only in terms of the way in which it is reflected in the feelings of the subject, Otto states.[11] This, of course, is the subject who experiences the holy. If one has had no experience of the holy, one is dissuaded by Otto from reading his book.[12] This remark at the beginning of the volume is a somewhat dramatic way of stressing that the subjective experience is the indispensible starting point of the phenomenology of religion.

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[10]Rudolf Otto, <u>The Idea of the Holy</u>, trans. by John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).

[11]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 12.

[12]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 8.

Otto's study is not a psychology of religion, however, because the objective correlate is also an indispensible element. The object is described as it is experienced by the subject. Without such knowledge of experience, one can have only a derivative verbal knowledge of the subject matter. Otto's book can convey only this latter form of knowledge.

The holy is experienced as a **mysterium**. It is something "wholly other,"[13] that is to say, something entirely different from everything else man has experienced and with which he is familiar. Man's response to the mysterious is described by the Latin word **stupor**, which Otto defines as being "an astonishment that strikes us dumb."[14]

Otto applies two adjectives to this substantive. The first, **tremendum**, indicates what he seems to consider the most significant aspect of the holy. It in turn contains three elements. The holy evokes in man a feeling of awe.[15] In this response of awe, man feels the holy to be absolutely unapproachable.[16] Together with this feeling of awe, there is also a sense of the majesty of the holy.[17] Thus the holy

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[13] _Ibid._, pp. 26, 28.

[14] _Ibid._, p. 26.

[15] _Ibid._, p. 14.

[16] _Ibid._, p. 19.

[17] _Ibid._

is also experienced as absolutely overpowering.[18] In addition, Otto suggests that there is an accompanying sense of "energy," but he does not explicate this aspect of the holy.[19]

Otto also attributes to the mystery of the holy the participle fascinans. The holy is "fascinating" in the sense that it is "attractive."[20] It "entrances" and "allures" man to itself,[21] despite the fact that it is also "tremendous."

From what has just been said, it is clear that Rudolf Otto is doing phenomenology of religion in his description of the holy as mysterium tremendum et fascinans. His method is based on a recognition of the duality of self and world, and he explicates the meaning of the holy in terms of man's subjective experience of the objective.

In turning from Otto to Brentano, one might have some misgivings about the prospects for finding a fully-developed phenomenology of religion. These misgivings would be justified, for Brentano was after all the fore-runner of the movement, not even its founder, and one could hardly expect to find his work a fully developed self-conscious phenomenology such as might be written a full century after he began his academic career. Yet Brentano most certainly did anticipate

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[20] Ibid., p. 31.

[21] Ibid.

the movement, as has been seen,[22] and one might still expect to see at least some adumbrations of a phenomenology of religion. Such can be found in Religion und Philosophie, and one illustration is Brentano's analysis of belief in God.

In order to recognize that Brentano's understanding of the nature of belief actually is an application of phenomenology, one must note the full range of that principle which is so characteristic of the movement. The principle of intentionality, namely that consciousness is always consciousness of an object, is often illustrated in terms of perception. Brentano himself analyzed seeing in terms of having something colored for an object.[23] This type of mental act might be the most suitable example for illustrating the principle of intentionality, and perception may very well enjoy a certain primacy among the types of mental acts. Still the principle has wider scope, and applies also to believing. Believing is believing in something. Accordingly, after having given the illustration of seeing, Brentano then turns to other mental acts, among them that of believing.[24] His characterization fits this category of mental act too. What is characteristic of the mental, he has said, is having something for an object. In the case of believing, one has for an object that in which one believes.

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[22]Supra.

[23]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 190.

[24]Ibid.

A question very naturally arises at this point. If Brentano is saying that consciousness is always consciousness of an object, does he then imply that whenever a person believes in something, that object must exist? This seems to be the case, the questioner would continue, since the act of believing, being intentional, must have an object, and that object is precisely what the person believes in.

This is a reasonable question, and one to which two aspects of Brentano's thought are relevant. First, let it be said that if there ever were any philosophical issue to which Brentano returned again and again, continually reviewing and revising his previous conclusions,[25] it was precisely the issue of the ontological status of the object of thought. Professor Kraus has collected and analytically arranged passages from his writings so as to illustrate Brentano's development of thought on this issue.[26]

Second, it should be noted that there are two remarks in _Religion_ _und_ _Philosophie_ which are relevant to the question of the ontological status of the object of thought. At one point in his discussion of what degree of trust can rightly be placed in outer perception (i. e., do we "see" something which really is not?), Brentano introduces the analogous

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[25]_Supra_.

[26]Franz Brentano, _The_ _True_ _and_ _the_ _Evident_, ed. by Oscar Kraus, trans. by Roderick M. Chisholm et.al. (New York: Humanities Press, 1966).

case of belief. He seems to take for granted that we can believe in (the existence of) Martians without their actually existing. Thus even though the intentional act of believing necessarily has an object, the ontological status of that object need not be the status of "real existence." That is to say, it appears to the writer, the mode of existence of the object of belief need not be the mode of existence which the believer considers the object of his belief to possess.

At another point in this book, Brentano rejects the ontological argument for the existence of God.[27] Although God may be immediately necessary, Brentano states, he could be evident to a man as immediately necessary only if that man were to possess a vision of him.[28] What this means for the topic under discussion is that Brentano rejects a single exceptional case in the nature of belief (namely that of the existence of God) wherein the belief in the existence of an object can be accompanied with a justifiable certitude that the object exists in the manner in which it is believed to exist.

There is yet another theme to be added to this account of what is the nature of belief in Brentano's thought. Religion und Philosophie also contains several remarks which indicate what it means to believe in the existence of God.

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[27]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, pp. 108-9.

[28]Ibid., p. 109.

In Brentano's analysis, if a person does believe in the existence of God, then this belief will have crucial ramifications for his view of the world and his understanding of his own role and destiny in the cosmos.

A rather informal presentation of Brentano's analysis is to be found in his "Philosophical Essay on Religion."[29] Here he speaks of God as the "infinitely perfect being." The man who knows (or, as we would say, believes) that the world has its origin in such an infinitely perfect being derives "an abundance of solace and joy" from this consideration.[30] If the reader supplies the premiss that an infinitely perfect being is eternally righteous--an elliptical argument not inappropriate for Brentano is this informal presentation-- then there can be deduced the just recompense (vergeltende Gerechtigkeit) of God.[31] From this there follow practical implications for one's life. On the one hand, this belief provides solace for the righteous in time of affliction. And on the other hand, it also provides an incentive to morality.

A more structured approach to this topic is to be found in Brentano's essay "On the Philosophy of Religion," also in this volume.[32] Essentially the same analysis is followed, only in a more structured form.

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[29] In Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, pp. 18-21.

[30] Ibid., p. 18.

[31] Ibid., p. 19.

[32] Ibid., p. 73.

It should be noted, as indicated above, that in these two essays Brentano is giving what he considers to be an analysis of the implications of the knowledge of the existence of God. In the first essays it is called an __Erkenntnis__, and in the second, a __Wissen__.[33] This may illustrate the non-technical interchangeability of these terms in his writings. At any rate, most readers of these essays would understand his reference to "knowledge" of the existence of God as being "belief" in the existence of God. Readers unwilling to make this terminological interchange may instead take the above two essays as being one aspect of a phenomenology of knowledge.

One reason for making the terminological interchange, however, is based on the insight that a person cannot have false knowledge, but can have false belief. The topic of the possibility of false belief does arise at another point in the first of the essays just mentioned.[34] Here Brentano speaks not of knowledge of the existence of God, but rather of conviction (__Überzeugung__) and belief (or, faith, __Glaube__). The question arises, whether this belief in the existence of God is not already confirmed in this life through its salutary effects, which have already been described. The major premiss of this argument, which Brentano mentions, is that error cannot

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[33]__Ibid.__, pp. 18, 72, respectively.

[34]__Ibid.__, p. 24

bring about consequences superior to those which follow from truth. Brentano rejects this argument, giving as a counter-example the case in which one lies to a sick man (where a true report of some tragic incident would have an adverse effect on his recovery). Brentano also mentions in this context Voltaire's famous saying that if God did not exist, man would have to invent him. Thus Brentano is able to give a phenomenological account of the act of believing, such that he can both assert that this act of consciousness always has an object, and that the belief may be false.

3. Brentano and Duméry

One final element in this analysis of Brentano's phenomenology of religion should be a comparison and contrast with the philosophy of Henry Duméry. It would be particularly enlightening to note which of Brentano's have been preserved, and what new elements have appeared, in the half-century between the time when Brentano wrote his original essays and the year in which The Problem of God was published.[35]

Duméry himself does philosophy within the phenomenological movement, and has published a number of books on the philosophy of religion. Yet, Professor Courtney remarks, his thought is

[35]Henry Duméry, Le Probleme de Dieu en philosophie de la religion (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1957), translated with an introduction by Charles Courtney as The Problem of God in Philosophy of Religion (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964).

to be distinguished from the phenomenology of religion.[36]
This sounds very strange until one realizes that he is here
referring to that school of scholars who try to describe the
features of religion without using any of the procedures
unique to phenomenology. From what has already been said, it
is clear that neither does Brentano belong to this school of
thought. One can contest only that such a school be permitted
to usurp the name "phenomenology of religion," and that
Rudolf Otto be counted among its members.

Brentano and Duméry are in full agreement in doing a
philosophy of religion which is based on the fundamental
principles of phenomenology. First, they focus on the struc-
ture of consciousness as a starting point in their study of
religion. Second, they note that this consciousness is
always consciousness of an object. Third, they preserve the
duality of subject and object. Duméry indicates, for example,
that his procedure ". . . must maintain the solidarity (while
distinguishing them) of subject and object."[37]

The fundamental difference between Brentano and Dumery
is that the one was a precursor of Edmund Husserl, and the
other is his follower. At times, Duméry denies being a

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[36]Ibid., p. xix.

[37]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

disciple of Husserl.[38] However, he makes such remarks while simultaneously adopting Husserl's terms and categories.[39] Duméry begins by accepting the general validity of the phenomenological process of reduction, and presupposes Husserl's three reductions, which he identifies as the "eidetic reduction," the "transcendental reduction," and the "full act of constitution."[40]

Duméry not only accepts Husserl's basic principles, but also goes beyond them. As long as anything "reducible" remains, it must be reduced, he states.[41] Now it is the case, he holds, that even after Husserl's three reductions have been performed, the task is not yet completed. There still remain a multiplicity of subjects and a plurality within the subject.[42] These too must be reduced. Hence a fourth reduction is necessary. When performed, it discloses God, "the One as an absolute simplicity."[43] This may be called the "henological reduction," from the Greek $\overset{c}{\epsilon}\nu$, "one."

The previous chapter, which undertook to characterize the phenomenological movement and to show how Brentano anticipated it as a proto-phenomenologist, has formed the antecedent

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[38]Ibid.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid., p. 43.

[42]Ibid., p. 49, n. 13.

[43]Ibid., p. 48.

for the present chapter. Here the question was raised, just what features must a study of religion possess in order to qualify as being a phenomenology of religion? The answer was found to be that such a study must be more than just an examination of a religion which appears in history, or of patterns common among various historical religions (even though each of these is a legitimate area of scholarship); such a study must incorporate into itself the phenomenological principle of the duality of self and world.

The question was then asked, have there been instances of such an approach, which would qualify for the title "phenomenology of religion" in a strict sense? Three such instances were proposed. One was Rudolf Otto's account of the meaning of the holy as a _mysterium tremendum et fascinans_. The second instance was Franz Brentano's account of belief (in the existence of God) as a case of the intentionality of consciousness. The third instance was Henry Duméry's methodology in _The Problem of God_. Each of these studies qualifies as phenomenology of religion because it is based on the duality of self and world, consciousness and object of consciousness.

V. BRENTANO'S DEFINITION OF "RELIGION"

The definition of "religion" is a central theme in modern philosophy of religion, and there are many significant aspects of Brentano's thought which have to do with this topic. Three major issues will be discussed in this chapter. The question will first be asked, what is the theoretical basis in terms of which Brentano proposes a definition of "religion"? It will then be asked whether this definition theory is inherently normative, so that it produces a judgmental definition of "religion." Finally, this chapter will inquire whether the definition of "religion" is in any way phenomenological in nature.

1. Definition Theory

The most famous modern contribution to definition theory is that of Ludwig Wittgenstein, developed in his late work Philosophical Investigations.[1] Wittgenstein has already introduced his theory of a language game in earlier sections of the book, but now he acknowledges that he has not yet stated what is the essence of a language game (Sprachspiel), or, consequently, of language. What follows is a discussion of games (Spiele), and there emerges from this a theory of definition.

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[1]Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ss. 65ff, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 31ff.

Wittgenstein holds that the various games constitute a family, and that one game is related to another through family resemblances. Yet there may not be any one feature which is shared by all members of the family. Thus two or more games may be related in as much as they share several characteristics. Nevertheless there is no one characteristic which is common to every game. As one progressively turns from one kind of game to another, and then to yet another, one notices that certain features drop out and others appear, so that the initial and final kinds of games have no common features.

Wittgenstein's theory of definition, expressed in terms of games, could be stated more abstractly. Various phenomena to which the same word is applied may share certain characteristics. Nevertheless there need not be any one characteristic common to all the phenomena to which the word is applied. This theory could be expressed in symbols as follows. There is a word W which is applied to all members of the family F. Each of these members, α, β, γ, δ, ϵ, ζ, η, θ, ι, etc., shares some of the characteristics a, b, c, d, e, f, etc. Yet no one characteristic is common to all members of the family.

This representation is suggested by Wittgenstein's remark that a thread is made up of many fibers, but no one fiber runs its full length.[2]

Franz Brentano also has a theory of definition, which appears in his endeavors to characterize "religion."[3] It can profitably be compared with Wittgenstein's theory in some respects, and contrasted with it in other regards.

Like Wittgenstein, Brentano also develops his definition theory by means of an example. His illustration comes from the world of botany. The point of reference is a "type" (Typus). This appears to be a form of plant life which possesses all of a number of characteristics. Other forms of plant life so to speak "approach" or "approximate" (annähern) the type. They approach it from one direction or another, to retain the spatial language, and some are nearer to the type than are others. The name of the "species" (Art) applies first of all to the type, and then derivatively to the other forms in so far as they approximate the type.

This definition can also be cast in a more abstract form. The circle T represents the type, which involves all of the characteristics a, b, c, d, e, f, and g. Greek letters stand for particular forms of life. Both forms α and β fall within

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[2]Ibid., s 67, p. 32.

[3]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, pp. 6-7 and 76.

the type, because they possess all of the characteristics a
through g, inclusive. Forms γ through ζ "approach" the
type, in that they possess some but not all of these charac-
teristics. Some possess more, and others fewer. Also, they
can approach from different directions; that is to say, the
forms possessing some but not all of the characteristics
may possess different characteristics. In an extreme case,
represented here by forms ε and ζ , the two may not have
any characteristics in common. The name N is applied

primarily to forms α and β, which possess all the charac-
teristics of the type, and derivatively to forms γ through
ζ, since the latter approximate the type by possessing some
of its characteristics. Yet even this schema falls short of
representing every aspect of Brentano's definition theory.
The model should be in three dimensions, since a form may,
according to Brentano, possess any given characteristic to a

greater or lesser extent.[4]

As can be seen from the above discussion, there are some interesting similarities and differences between Wittgenstein's and Brentano's theories of definition. On the one hand, they are in relative agreement about abandoning a theory of definition per genus et differentiam, in favor of definition by means of a congeries of characteristics. The two thinkers deploy these characteristics differently, as can be seen from the analytic models, but in each case the theory allows the name to be applied to individuals which may differ so widely as to share no common characteristic. On the other hand, the two theories differ about whether there is some norm. Wittgenste: gives no indication of believing that there is one, but Brentano does insist on a norm. It is the type. Thus the name can most properly be applied only to what possesses all the characteristics of the type. The name is applied derivatively to what possesses only some of these characteristics. Wittgenstein does not make this distinction, although he does acknowledge the existence of borderline cases.[5]

2. The Question of a Normative Definition

The preceding discussion of definition theory has laid

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[4]Ibid., p. 6.

[5]Wittgenstein, op. cit., ss 68-71, pp. 33-34.

the basis for examining how Brentano defines "religion."
Neither Wittgenstein nor Brentano had used the object of his
respective concern as an illustration of his definition theory.
Wittgenstein was interested in the question of how one might
define "language" (or a "language game"), but he employed
the idea of a game in general as the illustration of his
theory. Brentano used a biological frame of reference to
illustrate his theory of definition, but he was interested in
a definition of "religion."

The analytic model of Brentano's definition theory can
easily be interpreted in terms of religion. The name
"religion" is to be applied primarily to such instances as
fall within the "type." These instances will possess all of
a certain number of characteristics. The name "religion" will
also apply derivatively to certain other instances in so far
as they approximate the type by possessing some (but not all)
of these characteristics.

Two questions naturally arise at this point. First,
what are those characteristics which together constitute the
"type" religion? Second, how are they derived? The answer
to the second question must be deferred until the relation of
philosophy of religion is discussed, but the first question
can be answered now.

Brentano seems to have in mind several characteristics
which together constitute the type religion. Throughout

Religion und Philosophie one or more of these criteria either seem to be implicit in some discussion, or are explicitly mentioned, and thus one could almost footnote the discussion of these criteria as "passim." The best enumeration of them, interestingly enough, appears in a negative context. At one point Brentano argues that the primitive religions do not qualify for the type.[6] In order to prove his point, he shows that these religions lack certain characteristics. The perspicacious reader can conclude from this argument that these enumerated characteristics are precisely those which for Brentano constitute the type religion. They are: a) Knowledge of the infinitely perfect being; b) Knowledge of the primal explanatory ground of all phenomena; c) A basis for consolation and hope; and d) Support for the will.

There are two interesting features to be noted in this congeries of characteristics. First, the characteristics are not altogether independent of one another. In various contexts throughout the book Brentano seems to think that some of them follow from one or more of the others. This is not surprising, for the reader can see how the second characteristic could be derived from the first, and how the third and fourth follow from the first two. The other interesting feature of this congeries of characteristics is

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[6] Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 29.

how it is related to Brentano's theory of belief. It has
been shown that, for Brentano, belief in the existence of God
has some significant implications for the life of the believer.[7]
Among these are the theoretical benefit of understanding how
the world is founded in a primal being, and the practical
benefits of hope and consolation, on the one hand, and strength
for willing the good, on the other hand. By simple comparison,
one can see how Brentano's analysis of belief in the existence
of God is related to his definition of the type religion.

One does not enter very far into Brentano's discussion of
how religion is to be defined, before one begins to suspect
that an element of judgment is present. That is to say, one
wonders whether Brentano is developing a descriptive definition
or a normative definition of religion.

The question of a normative definition first arises when
one realizes that, according to Brentano's theory, some
instances approximate the type more closely than do others,
and in fact some instances may even fall within the type.
Does this suggest that an instance is "better," the more
closely it approaches the type? Perhaps, and perhaps not.
Brentano applies this kind of theoretical question to the
various religions. At one point he raises the question of
whether any historical religion corresponds to the type, and

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[7]Supra.

shortly after this remark he admits the possibility that no
historical religion will completely realize the type.[8] Thus
far in the analysis, it still seems to be an open question
whether the degree of approximation to the type can form the
basis for a value judgment of the specific religion under
consideration at a given time.

As a matter of fact, Brentano does seem to understand
his approach as a normative definition of religion. This is
suggested even more strongly by the way he describes
approximation to the type. It is not merely a question of
whether any religion "corresponds" (entspricht) to the type,[9]
but whether the type is "ideally realized" (ideal...verwirklicht)
in any historical religion.[10] Even yet the evidence is not
conclusive, for it is still possible that "ideal" may have
only logical significance, and no axiological meaning.

The case is established when one continues to examine
how Brentano describes the possible case of a religion which
does represent the type. He refers to it as "this highest
religion" (diese höchste /Religion7).[11] Those religions
possessing the characteristics which constitute the type are

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[8]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 29; cf. also p. 76.

[9]Ibid., p. 29.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid., p. 30.

spoken of as "the most highly developed" (die hochstausge-
bildeten).[12] Such modes of reference establish clearly that
Brentano considered his definition of religion to be normative.

Having acknowledged this judgmental element in the
definition, one is in a position to inquire whether Brentano
thinks that there is any instance of a religion which realizes
the type. There is an answer to this question, and it consists
of two parts. First, Brentano states that it is only the
monotheistic religions (by which he means primarily Judaism,
Christianity and Islam) which count as religions "in the
genuine sense" (im eigentlichen Sinne).[13] This means, it
would appear, that only they possess all the characteristics
necessary to qualify for the type. Since the definition
theory is normative, they would be the "highest" religions.
It also follows that when Brentano speaks of the so-called
"primitive religions," he is using the word "primitive" in a
pejorative sense.[14] Second, Brentano also suggests that if
any of the historical religions would be a realization of the
type, it would be Christianity.[15] Since this is a value
category for him, it appears that Christianity would be the

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[12]Ibid., p. 29.

[13]Ibid., p. 30.

[14]Ibid., p. 10.

[15]Ibid., p. 31.

"highest" religion in Brentano's eyes.

The reader of _Religion_ _und_ _Philosophie_ will note that the superiority of Christianity is a recurring theme, and that Brentano argues this point in various ways at different places in the book. On the one hand, there is the more formal argument based on Brentano's definition theory. This has just been described. On the other hand, there are also many informal arguments based on what might be called "common sense" criteria.

There are two places in the book, in particular, where Brentano argues for the superiority of Christianity from such informal criteria.[16] The reasons which he adduces are too great in number to be reproduced in full here, but several examples can be mentioned in order to illustrate their "common sense" nature. Brentano argues, for instance, that Christianity is superior because it is able to incorporate among its adherents both the uneducated and ungifted, on the one hand, and geniuses of the first rank (such as Aquinas and Pascal) on the other hand.[17] Or again, he gives as a reason for the superiority of Christianity the fact that it has been able to stimulate artistic creation.[18]

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[16]_Ibid._, pp. 33-35 and 81-85.

[17]_Ibid._, p. 33.

[18]_Ibid._, p. 83.

One would not want to take too seriously these "informal" arguments for the superiority of Christianity, so far as Brentano's philosophy of religion is concerned. Brentano does not show a very great appreciation of Eastern religions, and if he had been more familiar with Hinduism or Buddhism, for example, he might have been able to apply many of those same arguments to the latter religions. For example, one could argue that Shankara and Ramanuja were not intellectually inferior to Aquinas and Pascal, or that the stupa of Sanchi is not architecturally inferior to Chartres Cathedral. Furthermore, these "informal" or "common sense" arguments are peripheral to the major thrust of Brentano's philosophy, which is being followed in this analysis.

Before leaving this subject, however, one should note an interesting matter. Brentano has argued for the superiority of Christianity. Yet he had made a formal break with Christianity many years before writing these lines, and his religious interests are now philosophically oriented without any strong ecclesiastical affiliation. He is not writing as an adherent of the religion, and this should be kept in mind.

3. Phenomenology and the Definition of "Religion"

It might seem initially that nothing would be simpler than to give a phenomenological definition of "religion." After all, one might think, phenomenology is the science of

essences, the eidetic science.[19]   And the definition is the
formula of the essence.[20]   Therefore, one would conclude,
phenomenology is precisely the correct methodology for deriving
a definition of "religion."

Unfortunately the situation is not quite so simple. The
lesser of the two difficulties, it would appear, is that
Brentano's account of the type religion does not fit classical
definition theory. According to Aristotle, nothing which is
not the species of a genus will have an essence.[21] Brentano
establishes the type not per genus et differentiam, but by
means of a congeries of characteristics, as has been shown.

The greater of the two difficulties, however, is to be
found in the nature of phenomenology, as it relates to the
task of definition demanded of it. This is not to constitute
a rejection of phenomenology. Nor is it to deny the legitimacy
of seeking a definition of "religion." The problem is that
the method is not appropriate to the goal (or, putting the
matter the other way around, the goal is not appropriate to
the method).

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[21]The philosophical term "eidetic" comes from the classical
Greek word εἶδος, "form" (Liddell and Scott, op. cit., II,
482) and is one of the two words (along with ἰδέα, also "form")
used to refer to the Platonic forms.

[22]Aristotle, Metaphysics, Lambda, 4, trans. by W. D. Ross,
in Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. by Richard McKeon (New York:
Random House, 1941), p. 787.

[23]Ibid.

Phenomenology is the science of essences, to be sure, but one must inquire precisely what kinds of essences this science investigates. The answer to this question, it appears, is that phenomenology studies the essences of various forms of intentional consciousness. This would seem to be the case, first of all, from the previously developed characterization of this school of philosophy. It was said that the duality of consciousness and object of consciousness, or self and world, is central to phenomenology. If this account is correct, then phenomenology would study the essences of different ways in which thought thinks its object, or ways in which the world is for the self. From this it would follow that phenomenology could describe the object of consciousness as it is intended by consciousness, but could not give an account of the object itself. This approach could show how the self relates to the world, but could not describe the world in and of itself.

This same conclusion also follows from Husserl's account of "eidetic description" in the Cartesian Meditations.[22] Some conscious process, such as that of perceiving, is selected, and its intentional structure of noesis and noema is noted. Now the phenomenologist brackets out of consideration the question of whether the intentional object exists. Following this, he undertakes the process of "free variation," altering

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[22]Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 60-71.

the intentional object in first one respect and then another
(e. g., shape, color). This process reveals the range of
possibilities, as contrasted with the actual case at hand.

What then is the final result of this eidetic description?
It is the eidos perception! This is very important to note.
The result of eidetic description is not an account of the
intentional object, but instead an account of the intentional
act of consciousness. The result, in this particular case,
is not a description of the eidos chair, but instead the result
of the process of eidetic description is a characterization
of the eidos perception. In the process of such an investiga-
tion, the phenomenologist makes the transition from de facto
ego to the eidos ego (in explicating the eidos of one of the
modes of consciousness, in this case perception). Thus Husserl
can conclude:

> ...if we think of a phenomenology developed as an
> intuitively a priori science purely according to
> the eidetic method, all its eidetic researches are
> nothing else but uncoverings of the all-embracing
> eidos, transcendental ego as such...[23](emphasis his).

Thus phenomenology, as a science of essences, appears to
study the εὐδη of various types of intentional consciousness.

If this account of phenomenology is correct, then the
method cannot justifiably be expected to produce a definition
of "religion," as religion is conventionally understood. It

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[23]Ibid., p. 71.

would be something which appears in the world. Religion, so understood, would not be <u>directly</u> accessible to phenomenology, since the latter studies intentional consciousness, and the world only in so far as it or some part of it becomes the intended object of consciousness.

At this point one might ask whether there might not be some indirect way in which phenomenology could arrive at a definition of "religion," even though this method does not have direct access to religion as something existing of itself in the socio-historical world. There is such a way. Phenomenology could first give an account of that mode of consciousness which is religious concern, and could then speak of religion as the manifestation of this religious concern in the socio-historical world.

This approach may be found in <u>First Chapters in Religious Philosophy</u>, by Vergilius Ferm.[24] Professor Ferm does not identify his method as phenomenology, to be sure, but nevertheless his approach is entirely consistent with the nature of phenomenology which has been presented here. He identifies three terms—"being religious," "a religion," and "religion"—and holds the first of these terms to be basic.[25] This approach is consistent with phenomenology in that it focusses attention

[24]Vergilius Ferm, <u>First Chapters in Religious Philosophy</u> (New York: Round Table Press, 1937).

[25]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 61.

upon a mode of consciousness, here that of "being religious."

This basic term is defined as follows:

> To be religious is to effect in some way and to
> some measure a vital adjustment (however tenta-
> tive and incomplete) to w(W)hatever is reacted
> to or regarded implicitly or explicitly as worthy
> of serious or ulterior concern.[26]

This approach is consistent with phenomenology in the further respect that the mode of consciousness under analysis is discovered to be intentional in nature. There is no adjustment without something to which one adjusts, no concern without an object of concern. Professor Ferm then proceeds to define "a religion" in terms of his prior definition of "being religious." It is "a body of theory and practice which has relevance to people who are themselves religious."[27] Finally, "religion" is defined as the class term for all religions.[28]

Professor Tyler Thompson has more recently proposed a definition of "religion" which also illustrates this approach earlier followed by Professor Ferm. Professor Thompson describes religion as being

> belief in, devotion to, and service of that
> upon which one regards oneself as ultimately
> dependent (or, ...dependent for one's salva-
> tion).[29]

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[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid., p. 65.

[28]Ibid., p. 68.

[29]Tyler Thompson, lecture in Philosophy of Religion D-6, "World Views of Living Religions," Garrett Theological Semi-nary, Fall Quarter, 1967.

This approach also meets the characteristics of phenomenology, as it has been presented. First, belief, devotion, and (in a more complex way) service are all acts of consciousness. And second, they are all intentional: belief in..., devotion to..., service of.... These same characteristics also apply to the act of regarding oneself as being ultimately dependent.

Professors Ferm and Thompson are not entirely in agreement, of course. The latter traces the inspiration for his definition back to Edgar Sheffield Brightman, and not to Ferm (although Brightman in turn drew upon Ferm).[30] Each definition uses some elements of Tillichian terminology, "concern" in the one case and "ultimate" in the other. They differ in that Professor Ferm explicitly designates the concerns of which he speaks as "ulterior," while Professor Thompson characterizes the dependence of which he speaks as being "ultimate."[31] Furthermore, Dr. Ferm admits the possibility that this religious concern could be either "implicit" or "explicit" in one's self-understanding, while Dr. Thompson's definition might imply that the dependence must be acknowledged explicitly. The issues at stake here are whether one must have an ultimate

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[30]Edgar Sheffield Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940), p. 17.

[31]The English words "ulterior" and "ultimate" come from the Latin ulterior and ultimus, respectively, which are the comparative and superlative forms of the adjective ulter, "beyond."

concern in order to be religious, and whether one must explicitly acknowledge this concern (or dependence). Fortunately these issues need not be resolved here, since this discussion is concerned with the feature which these definitions have in common, and not with ways in which they differ.

If it is possible to define "religion" (at least indirectly) by means of phenomenology, then the question suggests itself, can such an approach be found in Brentano's philosophy of religion? The answer is affirmative, if one keeps in mind the qualification which has already been made about other aspects of his thought. Brentano was a proto-phenomenologist, and one can expect to find in his works only anticipations and intimations of later phenomenology. One cannot often expect to find in his writings elaborately exfoliated doctrines which have consciously been derived according to a methodology specifically identified as phenomenological.

Brentano's definition of "religion," which has been described above, is essentially an account of a "type," consisting of certain characteristics, which may be realized to varying degrees by different socio-historical entities within the world. This account is confined (at least directly) to the world in and of itself, and does not refer this world back to the self as its correlate pole. Thus it is not primarily a phenomenological definition.

Although Brentano's definition of religion is not directly phenomenological, still it is related to another aspect of his thought in such a way that it indirectly takes on a phenomenological character. This other element is the concept of a need (Bedürfnis). One can see that a human need is a phenomenon of such a nature that it is accessible to phenomenological research. A need is intentional; that is to say, it is always correlated with an object which is needed. Any person cannot need without needing something, regardless of just what the ontological status of the needed object might be. As Brentano remarks, a longing (Verlangen, which he uses here as a synonym for Bedürfnis) must be directed to a true or supposed good, or complex of goods.[32]

When Brentano speaks of needs in this context, he seems to be thinking of needs far ulterior to those of every-day life. These needs merely begin with the basic necessities for biological life, and progress to more profound levels of human existence. Brentano dismisses "practical interests" for which primitives prayed to their idols. Experience has taught that such needs can better be met through human efforts, he states.[33]

Brentano's analysis of human need is quite reminiscent

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[32]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 7.

[33]Ibid., p. 11.

of the manner in which Aristotle begins the Metaphysics.
Brentano recognizes certain universal human needs, among them
intellectual needs,[34] and he remarks that all men desire
knowledge.[35] This is certainly an echo of Aristotle's famous
statement "All men by nature desire to know."[36] Yet Brentano
also asserts, rightly or wrongly, that men first devote their
efforts to satisfying their more immediate needs, and only
subsequently turn to the search for truth.[37] This latter view
is also found at the beginning of the Metaphysics, where
Aristotle remarks that the theoretical disciplines arose only
when there was leisure, after the necessities of life had
been met.[38]

While stressing the theoretical needs of man, Brentano
also recognizes certain basic practical needs. These are
not the necessities of life which he has already dismissed,
but rather needs of a more fundamental nature. The intellec-
tual need which is so fundamental to man is the knowledge of
the first ground of all things,[39] and the ultimate purpose

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[34]Ibid., p. 73.

[35]Ibid., p. 77; cf. also pp. 8, 11.

[36]Aristotle, Metaphysics, Alpha, 1, in McKeon, op. cit.,
p. 689.

[37]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, pp. 8, 77-8.

[38]Aristotle, loc. cit., in McKeon, op. cit., pp. 690-91.

[39]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 73.

of the world.[40] The basic practical needs of man are, on the one hand, consolation and hope, and on the other hand, motivation for doing the good as it is known to us.[41]

The analysis of Brentano's concept of need has now progressed sufficiently far for one to see how these fundamental human needs are, in his mind, related to religion. It has been stated that the type religion is constituted by certain characteristics,[42] and these were just enumerated. The basic human needs have just now been described. By comparing the two groups, one can see that the fundamental human needs, theoretical and practical, correspond to the basic characteristics of religion. What Brentano is saying, then, is that religion, a general phenomenon in the life of mankind, stands in relation to needs basic to the nature of man.[43] Since his definition theory is normative, and for him a religion is "higher" as it more closely approximates the type, Brentano can also say that a religion is "higher" the more it can satisfy these human needs.[44]

Since the definition of "religion" is a major theme in the philosophy of religion, this chapter has discussed at some

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[40]Ibid., p. 77.

[41]Ibid., p. 73.

[42]Supra,

[43]Brentano, Philosophie und Religion, p. 7.

[44]Ibid., p. 81.

length three aspects of Brentano's thought. There was first developed an analysis of the theoretical foundations in terms of which Brentano gives a definition of "religion." Then it was shown that this definition theory contains a normative aspect, so that the resulting definition of "religion" is judgmental. Finally, it was suggested that there is one indirect way in which a definition of "religion" can be phenomenological in nature, and that Brentano's linking the basic human needs with religion is an example of this approach.

VI. EPISTEMOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

The epistemology of religious knowledge is an important theme in the philosophy of religion. The relationship of philosophy to religion is another significant topic in this field of study. These two themes are closely related in the thought of Franz Brentano, because epistemology is the issue in terms of which Brentano examines the similarities and differences between philosophy and religion. The purpose of this chapter is to organize Brentano's remarks on epistemology, which are scattered throughout Religion und Philosophie, and thus to develop a systematic framework in which it becomes clear how Brentano saw epistemology to be the central issue between philosophy and religion.

1. Epistemology and the Knowledge of God

The first part of this discussion will collect Brentano's remarks on the basic themes of epistemology: The foundations of knowledge, the transmission of knowledge, and the nature of wisdom. In each case the discussion will show what implications this theme has for the knowledge of God.

The best point at which to begin an analysis of Brentano's epistemology is his idea of immediate knowledge. The terms "immediate" (unmittelbar) and "mediate" (mittelbar) are technical terms. "Mediate knowledge" is indirect knowledge, that is, knowledge which is derived from other knowledge. "Immediate

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knowledge" is direct knowledge. Situations in which we can "really know" (wirklich erkennen) something may be instances of either immediate or mediate knowledge.[1]

One category of real knowledge for Brentano is to be found among what might be called formal deductive systems, such as mathematics. One instance of such knowledge would be an axiomatic judgment, and another would be a mathematical theorem understood on the basis of proof.[2] Presumably if there were such an instance of mediate "real knowledge," it would have to derive ultimately from an instance of immediate knowledge. Even with this qualification one might have considerable reservations about such a system's sufficiency for knowledge. One could object that a formal deductive system of itself could not provide information about the world. Behind such an objection there is the issue whether geometry can of itself yield knowledge of the configuration of space. This issue will metamorphose itself and reappear shortly. Yet one should note that some remarks which Brentano makes elsewhere may qualify his position here.[3] He suggests that a priori mathematical theorems have only a negative quality. For positive knowledge, these axioms must be combined with.

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[1]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 43.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., pp. 94, 102.

immediate factual perceptions.

Another category of real knowledge, for Brentano, is that of "inner perception." Brentano recognizes two kinds of "intuition" (Anschauung),[4] that is, two ways in which particular entities may be known. One of these is "outer perception" (äussere Wahrnehmung), which is sensory perception of things localized in the external world.[5] The other is "inner perception" (innere Wahrnehmung), which is self-perception.[6]

These two kinds of perception differ in their epistemological value, for Brentano. He includes the category of inner perception among the cases of "true factual knowledge."[7] Brentano is far more sceptical about the epistemological value of outer perception. What the latter yields is not knowledge, but blind conviction[8] or "blind judgments."[9] Brentano repeatedly and in numerous contexts indicates that outer perception is of questionable value epistemologically.[10] Our relationship to outer perception is that of "instinctive

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[4]Ibid., p. 187.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid., p. 101.

[8]Ibid., p. 43.

[9]Ibid., p. 143.

[10]Ibid., pp. 43, 101, 103, 143.

trust,"[11] or of an "instinctive compulsion" to trust it.[12]
It lacks immediate evidence.[13] It might also be mentioned
here that Brentano considers memory to have the same episte-
mological status as does outer perception.[14]

These elements of Brentano's epistemology which have
been interspersed throughout Religion und Philosophie have
a foundation in his theory of evidence. This theory was out-
lined in three essays which Brentano wrote in 1915, that is,
during the period when he was also writing the material which
appears in Religion und Philosophie.[15] In this theory the
word "evidence" (Evidenz) is a technical term. Evidence is
the basis for an evident judgment, and an evident judgment is
one that cannot be in error, states Brentano in one of these
essays.[16] He further remarks in another essay on this subject
that judgments which are evident may be either directly or
indirectly evident, that they may be either truths or reason

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[11]Ibid., p. 43.

[12]Ibid., p. 143.

[13]Ibid., p. 103.

[14]Ibid., pp. 43, 101, 143.

[15]Franz Brentano, The True and the Evident, ed. by. Oskar
Kraus, trans. by Roderick Chisholm, et al. (New York: Humaniti
Press, 1966).

[16]"The Evident" in ibid., p. 126.

or judgments of fact, and that only the latter may be affirmative.[17] All three of these points, it has been noted, reappear in _Religion und Philosophie_. A specific reflection of this theory appears, for example, in Brentano's remark that inner perception is the basis for a judgment with evidence (_mit Evidenz_).[18]

The reader will note that the fundamental principles of Brentano's epistemology do not make any allowance for a direct knowledge of God. This observation is corroborated by Brentano's own remarks at two places in this book. He denies that God, the necessary first being, is ever present to us in intuition (_Anschauung_) and immediate experience.[19] Our knowledge of God is indirect.[20] In stating this he refers to Aristotle's famous remark that what is first in and for itself is not first for our knowledge.[21]

Brentano's theory of the basis of knowledge leads to his theory of the transmission of knowledge. Expressed in logical terms, this theory holds that knowledge of a conclusion can be held and transmitted either with or without knowledge of the premises.

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[17]"On the Evident," _ibid._, p. 130.

[18]Brentano, _Religion und Philosophie_, p. 126.

[19]_Ibid._, p. 101.

[20]_Ibid._, p. 18.

[21]_Ibid._, p. 101.

Brentano uses two technical terms in this discussion.[22]
Actual knowledge (das aktuelle Wissen) is knowledge present
before one's mind at a given moment. Habitual knowledge (das
habituelle Wissen) is not. It seems to be knowledge which
was actual at a previous time, but is not now. What is im-
portant is that one can remember previously having had this
knowledge as actual, whether or not one recalls it to mind
at a given moment.

Of all the points which Brentano makes in this book, his
theory of the transmission of knowledge is illustrated most
frequently. An individual person can carry out a long and
intricate argument this way.[23] Once having proved certain
premises, he need no longer remember their proofs, but simply
remember that they have been proved, and thus is able to pro-
ceed on this basis. The point is that in a very intricate
proof, not every step can be kept in mind at the same time.
This same principle applies to the communal life also. Once
a mathematician has worked out a table of logarithms, other
mathematicians can simply consult this table without having
to calculate the logarithms themselves.[24]

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[22]Ibid., p. 13.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., p. 99.

In these two illustrations a conclusion is held or
transmitted without the premises (or calculations) which
have led up to it. Brentano's distinction could be applied
by saying that the conclusion is actual knowledge, while the
premises are habitual knowledge. The justification of such
a procedure, in every-day terms, is convenience. In pheno-
menological terms, its justification is that human thought is
discursive.

There is in some cases another justification as well for
transmitting the knowledge of a conclusion without the con-
comitant knowledge of the premises. This is the way in which
the expert speaks to the layman, states Brentano. Historians
laboriously study ancient documents, and gradually develop a
reconstruction of an historical event. It is only this
resultant account which they transmit to the general reader,
and not the uninterpreted quantity of original sources.[25]
Likewise an astronomer makes use of many telescope observations
and much computation to arrive at new astronomical knowledge.
It is his conclusion which he transmits to the layman, and
not the collection of raw data and calculations.[26]

Brentano's theory of how knowledge is transmitted may be
applied to the knowledge of God. In one case, the ancestors
of a people may have had the leisure at some time to inquire

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[25]Ibid., pp. 15-16, 98.

[26]Ibid., pp. 15, 95.

about the first cause and ultimate aim of the world.[27]   The

religion which results from their inquiry would be transmitted

from generation to generation.   These subsequent generations

would receive the religion as believers, relying upon the

authority of their ancestors.   In this case, it would appear,

the conclusions would be transmitted without the possibility

of retrieving the original premises which led to them.

In another case of the transmission of knowledge, some

men have reasoned philosophical knowledge of God, while others

are incapable of this.   In such a case the former parties

could convey their conclusions to the latter, even though

these persons could not understand the reasoning which led

to the conclusions.[28]   This case appears to parallel the case

already mentioned in which the astronomer conveys knowledge to

the layman.   Yet Brentano notes that the natural sciences

enjoy a following which philosophical theology does not, and

this fact seems to sadden him considerably.[29]   He attributes

the lack of recognition to two factors.   On the one hand, the

natural scientists are in agreement among themselves, while

philosophers are not.   On the other hand, natural science has

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[27]Ibid., pp. 77-78.

[28]Ibid., p. 98.

[29]Ibid., p. 23.

implications which can be verified in this life, while the implications of philosophical theology can be verified only in the next life.[30] This latter remark is interesting, for it anticipates by about fifty years Professor Hick's theory of eschatological verification.[31]

There are however two qualifications which one might want to append to Brentano's theory of the transmission of knowledge. First, it does not seem to be the case that value is confined to the conclusions of an investigation, and is totally lacking from the data (even though public school textbooks are almost always written from this point of view). Knowledge of the primary sources from an historical period can provide an understanding of the period which could be supplemented by, but never replaced by a textbook reconstruction. Furthermore, knowledge of how a conclusion was arrived at can be as interesting and informative in its own way as is the conclusion itself. This is especially the case in the natural science, for "science" as it is commonly understood is a methodology as well as a body of knowledge.

The other way in which Brentano's theory of knowledge could be qualified is suggested, ironically enough, by one of

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[30]Ibid.

[31]John Hick, "Theology and Verification" in The Existence of God, ed. by idem (New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 252-274.

the examples which he himself employed in support of his
theory.[32] Sir Isaac Newton decided to trust in Euclid's
authority, and to build new knowledge upon this already
existing foundation. If he had decided to reword Euclid's
proofs, he would have had considerably less time to devote to
new problems, states Brentano.

This example was an unfortunate choice, because it
really proves the opposite. Euclid's geometry contained the
famous "parallel postulate," which even the early commentators
recognized as in some sense problematic. Recent mathemati-
cians such as Lobachevsky and Riemann have replaced the parallel
postulate by other postulates, and in this way they have
developed different geometries. It has become questionable
whether real space is best described by Euclid's geometry, or
by non-Euclidian geometry, and this question of course has
great ramifications for physics and astronomy. Thus Newton
would have done well to examine more rigorously the mathema-
tical foundations upon which he built his own physics. The
implication of this for Brentano's epistemology, of course,
is that if conclusions are recalled or transmitted from one
party to another as knowledge, it is wise to examine at least
periodically the premisses from which these conclusions were
derived.

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[32]Brentano, _Religion und Philosophie_, p. 16.

It has already been mentioned that the German word
Wissenschaft has a broader scope than the English word
"science."[33] This is so in Brentano's usage of the word.
For him, science (Wissenschaft) includes natural science
(Naturwissenschaft), but it also includes many other kinds
of knowledge, including religious knowledge.[34] Science, in
this broader sense, includes proofs of the existence of God
and the immortality of the soul.[35]

The one of the sciences which, unlike the others, does
penetrate on to the first ground of all things is called
"wisdom" (Weisheit).[36] It is also called "first philosophy,"
"metaphysics," and "theology," states Brentano.[37]

Brentano devotes considerable attention to just what is
the proper name for this knowledge of God. The term "wisdom"
is applicable, because the wise man is he who participates
in the most exalted knowledge, and a form of knowledge is
exalted to the extent that its object of knowledge is exalted.[38]
Yet the sublimity of God so exceeds the power of human com-
prehension that one would humbly exchange the title of "wise

[33]Supra.

[34]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 70.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ibid., p. 94.

[37]Ibid., pp. 73, 90, 110.

[38]Ibid., p. 89.

man" for the more modest title of philosopher ("lover of wisdom").[39] Wisdom ($\sigma o\phi\iota\alpha$) becomes philosophy ($\phi\iota\lambda o\sigma o\phi\iota\alpha$).

While Brentano usually speaks of wisdom as one of the sciences, as has been noted, he also observes that former usage was different.[40] At one time, he states, science included explanation through reference to the very foundations (die Gründe) of that which was to be explained. No such account is possible in the case of man's knowledge of God, since God is uncaused.[41] Accordingly, wisdom is to be called "insight" (Einsicht), not "science." But it also considers the creation of God with reference to its creator, and in this respect wisdom is "science" (Wissenschaft). Thus wisdom has two constituent parts, theology (which is insight), and cosmology (which is science).

Brentano's terminology has been discussed at some length here because it differs so considerably from the meanings of the English "equivalent" terms in philosophical discourse.

There is an objection which might be raised nevertheless. This has to do with Brentano's use of the term "wisdom." One could argue that the wise man is he who both knows the structures of value in human life, and lives according to them.

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[39]Ibid., p. 90.

[40]Ibid., p. 100.

[41]Infra.

Thus the word "wisdom" would be misapplied to a merely cognitive knowledge of the necessary being, one could object.

Brentano might have responded to such an objection by saying that his epistemology does meet these requirements. He would say, first of all, that wisdom knows God to be not only absolutely necessary, but also absolutely good.[42] Then Brentano would continue, secondly, that such knowledge does have profound implications for how one lives one's life.[43]

This discussion has systematized the three basic themes of epistemology which are interspersed throughout Religion und Philosophie: The foundations of knowledge, the transmission of knowledge, and wisdom as a form of knowledge. In each case the discussion showed what implications this theme has for the knowledge of God.

2.   Religion and Philosophy

The discussion in this section will continue by indicating the direction in which Brentano argues for the existence of God, and how his conclusions affect the way in which he considers religion to be related to philosophy.

Franz Brentano had great confidence in the possibility of knowing the existence of God. Science (Wissenschaft) has been able to prove the existence of God just as soundly as any

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[42]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 95.

[43]Ibid., pp. 95-97.

proposition of natural science (Naturwissenschaft), he states.[44]
God is known from his works,[45] and one reasons back from these
works to their first cause.[46] For Brentano, then, God is
known on the basis of an a posteriori theistic argument. We
have no a priori insight into the existence of God, and the
ontological argument is untenable.[47]

Proof of the existence of God was a topic which interested
Brentano greatly, and the core of his thought on the issue is
to be found in his book Vom Dasein Gottes.[48] The theistic
arguments also appear in Religion und Philosophie, for a
number of the essays in Part Two deal wholly or in part with
proofs for the existence of God. There will be mentioned
here the various approaches to a demonstration which are out-
lined in these essays, and then the implications which such
proofs of the existence of God have upon the philosophy of
religion developed in Religion und Philosophie.

Brentano mentions three ways in which the existence of
God can be demonstrated: From motion, from contingency, and
from teleology.[49] All of these, one will note, are a posteriori

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[44]Ibid., p. 70.

[45]Ibid., p. 89.

[46]Ibid., p. 101.

[47]Ibid., p. 109.

[48]Franz Brentano, Vom Dasein Gottes, ed. by Alfred Kastil
(Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1929).

[49]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 140.

arguments. The third of these is outlined in his essay "God is the Creator of the World...."[50] According to this argument, the purposive order of the world can be explained not through an indwelling intelligence, but only through the intelligence of a master craftsman (Werkmeister) of the world. The first of these arguments is reflected in the essay on "The Necessity of a First Cause."[51] Here Brentano discusses the relationship of a sequence of secondary (relatively necessary) causes to a primary (absolutely necessary) cause.

The remaining theistic argument is more complex, for it involves two steps. Brentano holds that one cannot prove the existence of God merely from the fact that something exists.[52] Having accomplished this, one would then show that this must be traced back to an absolutely necessary being, since the contrary (absoluter Zufall) is impossible.[53]

These theistic arguments are significant in the whole system that is Franz Brentano's philosophy of religion, because they show how man can have in wisdom a scientific (wissenschaftlich) knowledge of the existence of God as the being who is absolutely necessary in himself and the first cause of

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[50] Ibid., pp. 131-132.

[51] Ibid., pp. 136-139.

[52] Ibid., p. 109.

[53] Ibid., pp. 120-126.

the world.

The discussion has now progressed sufficiently for one to note a certain connection between several elements in Brentano's thought. This chapter has shown that Brentano was confident that human reason is capable of arriving at knowledge of God, who is necessary and perfect in himself and the explanatory ground of the world. It has already been shown that for Brentano such theoretical knowledge has practical implications, giving man hope and consolation, and strengthening his will to do the good.[54] Now when one considers all these themes together, one discovers that they form precisely that set of characteristics which constitute the type religion.[55]

This connection provides the answer to two questions which would very naturally arise from an examination of Brentano's definition of "religion." The first question has to do with the origin of the norm. Wittgenstein's definition theory has already been compared with Brentano's theory, and it has been noted that the former does not acknowledge the existence of a norm, whereas the latter does.[56] Thus the question suggests itself, what is the source of Brentano's norm? The norm is not derived from the subject matter; on

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[54]_Supra._

[55]_Supra._

[56]_Supra._

the contrary, Brentano judges the subject matter in terms of it. This norm is brought to the definition from another part of Brentano's philosophy of religion. The present discussion of Brentano's epistemology discloses that wisdom, as he characterizes it, is the source of his norm. Wisdom is able to conduct an argument for the existence of God. The conclusion of this argument, together with the implications to be derived therefrom, constitutes the norm for Brentano's definition of "religion."

The other question which arises from Brentano's definition of religion can also be answered now. This question has to do with the relationship of phenomenology to normative judgments. On the one hand, phenomenology is often thought to be a descriptive science, not a normative one. This phenomenology would give a descriptive account of how consciousness intends an object, for example. Professor Thompson's definition of "religion" has been found to be both phenomenological and normative. One would ask, how is this possible?

The answer to this question, it appears, is that the normative aspect of Brentano's definition of "religion" does not arise out of the phenomenological aspect of his definition. The definition is phenomenological in that it involves an intentional structure of consciousness, as has already been pointed out.[57] The definition is normative in that it posits

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[57]Supra.

certain characteristics which must be met for something to qualify as a religion.[58] These two aspects of Brentano's definition are not entirely unrelated, to be sure. However, the normative nature of the definition does not follow from its phenomenological nature. Instead, as has just been noted, the normative aspect of Brentano's definition of religion comes from what he characterizes as wisdom. The phenomenological aspect of the definition arises from the fact that the content of this norm can become the object of intentional consciousness.

It is no wonder that Brentano conceives of religion and philosophy as being quite close to one another. He states for example that the interests which led to religion were the same as those which led to philosophy,[59] and that accordingly religion stands nearer to philosophy than to the "superstitions" of the "barbarians."[60] It is easy to understand how Brentano would come to such a view, since that philosophical undertaking which he calls "wisdom" does in fact provide the norm for his definition of "religion."

Nevertheless Brentano does conceive of one very important difference between religion and philosophy. This lies in the area of epistemology. It is clear from the preceding discussion

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[58]Supra.

[59]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, pp. 11, 36.

[60]Ibid., p. 12.

that, in Brentano's eyes, religion and philosophy agree to a very considerable extent in their conclusions. Each teaches an absolutely necessary being, who is the first ground of the world. From this teaching there follows hope and solace, on the one hand, and strength for the will, on the other hand. While religion and philosophy thus share many of the same conclusions (in Brentano's view), it is not necessarily the case that they should arrive at these same conclusions by the same means. This is in fact the way in which religion and philosophy differ, for Brentano. The point of difference lies not in the results, but in the method.

Brentano devotes some considerable attention in _Religion und Philosophie_ to the question of religious epistemology. Some of the topics are hypothetical options which Brentano himself acknowledges have never been adopted by the church. Others, such as the validation of revelation by miracles, are themes which were once topics of considerable religious discussion, but which have subsequently lost most of their influence in constructive theology. Nevertheless there arises from Brentano's discussion of religious epistemology one theme which does seem to have a rather general significance for the philosophy of religion. This is the relationship of conviction to evidence.

The foundation of Brentano's analysis is his distinction

between "certainty" and "certitude."[61] As has been mentioned, these two words translate the German Sicherheit and Gewissheit, respectively.[62] The former indicates the degree of reliability which a truth claim may possess. The latter term indicates the tenacity with which a person may hold such a claim to be true. Certainty and certitude may, or may not, coincide in any given case. A person may hold a view far more tenaciously than the evidence warrants. In this case his certitude would exceed the certainty of the truth claim. Or, contrariwise, a person may not grant a proposition the credence which it deserves. Yet another possibility, of course, is that a person may appraise the situation correctly, and then his certitude would be in keeping with the certainty of the proposition in question.

Brentano's criticism of religion is cast in terms of this destinction between certainty and certitude. A disproportionate belief is one in which the latter element exceeds the former. At times Brentano simply suggests that religions run the danger of requiring disproportionate belief from their adherents, and that a religion rates higher on the scale of perfection the more it avoids this danger.[63] At other times Brentano indicates more clearly that in his eyes the Christian

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[61]Ibid., p. 50.

[62]Supra.

[63]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, pp. 81-82.

Church is guilty of requiring disproportionate belief.[64] His own position on the matter is that it is a more rational and salutary situation if a person's conviction is in harmony with the degree of probability.[65] "If God had wanted to require of us more than mere conviction of probability," states Brentano concerning church dogmatics, "then he would have given us more than a mere grounds of probability."[66]

This preceding discussion of how Brentano views philosophy, and how he conceives of religion, has laid the foundation for the final element in this chapter, how Brentano thinks philosophy and religion are related.

This topic has been deferred until last for a specific reason. It is the judgment of this writer that the question "How is religion related to philosophy?" is in fact a complex question. There are many different philosophies, and the question is not answerable until one specifies which philosophy one has in mind. Thus the question would be answered differently if one were thinking of analytic philosophy, on the one hand, or Brentano's philosophy on the other. Professor F. Zuurdeeg, for example, held that it is _not_ the function of philosophy to establish, by the use of reason, the existence

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[64]_Ibid._, pp. pp. 85-86.

[65]_Ibid._

[66]_Ibid._, p. 55.

of God.[67] The function of philosophy is to analyze languages, he stated.[68] Thus the function of the philosophy of religion would be to analyze religious language.[69] This approach differs quite considerably from Brentano's position. For Brentano, as has been noted, philosophy (as wisdom) is capable of giving man knowledge about God, who is the absolutely necessary being and first ground of the world. These two radically different approaches illustrate how important it is to specify what philosophical position one has in mind when one asks how religion is related to philosophy.

Brentano's view of how religion and philosophy are related can be expressed rather succinctly: Religion is a substitute (Ersatz) for philosophy.[70] It is "a philosophy of the people" eine Philosophie des Volkes).[71]

This theory is not asserted without any supporting argument. On the contrary, the theory has as its context considerable prior analysis of the nature of philosophy and the nature of religion. This has already been mentioned, and there remains only to show how these themes relate to one another. Brentano has said that man has certain fundamental

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[67]Willem F. Zuurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy of Religion (New York: Abingdon Press, 1958), p. 13.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Ibid., p. 14.

[70]Ibid., p. 78.

[71]Ibid.

needs, and in various discussions it has become clear that
religion and philosophy each satisfy these needs. In order
for a religion to be a substitute for philosophy, of course,
it must perform the same function as does philosophy.
Brentano believes this to be the case, and devotes one section
to a rather thorough-going argument that religion and philo-
sophy respond to the same basic needs of man.[72]   Since
Brentano does derive the norm for a definition of "religion"
from philosophy, as has already been argued, one can see why
he would consider the correspondence of an historical religion
to the type to be an equivalent for its adequacy as a substi-
tute for philosophy.[73]

One question naturally presents itself at this point:
If religion is merely ersatz-philosophy, why not have the
genuine article instead? Brentano would make two remarks in
response to this question. First, he would probably challenge
the tone of the question as being deprecatory to religion.
Religion does give man answers to his highest needs, he
would say, and therefore is not to be demeaned. Second, Brentano
would add that although all men have these needs, not everyone
is able to satisfy them through scientific (wissenschaftlich)
knowledge.[74] In other words, religion arose out of a need for

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[72]Ibid., pp. 35-39.

[73]Ibid., p. 29.

[74]Ibid., p. 74.

philosophy, together with the inability to give this need scientific satisfaction.[75] Religion is a substitute (*Eratz*),[76] which can compensate (*ersentzen*) man for his lack of wisdom.[77]

One should note that Brentano also believes there is another kind of surrogate (*Surrogat*) of philosophy, with which religion should not be confused. This latter kind is "degenerate" philosophy. The history of philosophy periodically goes through certain cycles, he believes, and there develop philosophical systems, such as that of Hegel, which are surrogates of true philosophy.[78]

Even if one is willing to grant Brentano the entire framework in which his theory is set, there still arises one question about how adequately he characterizes the relationship of philosophy (as he sees it) to religion (as he sees it). This shortcoming can be identified if one consults a characterization of religion such as the one by Professor Thompson.[79] According to such an account, religion involves not only belief, but also devotion and service. One would also be inclined to add that religion also usually involves

[75]Ibid., p. 38.

[76]Ibid., p. 74.

[77]Ibid., p. 28.

[78]Ibid., pp. 24-28, 152, 166.

[79]Supra.

a community of religious persons. Now while religion and philosophy may agree in the area of belief, they do not necessarily have these other characteristics in common, one might argue. Therefore, it could be maintained, religion is not merely a surrogate of philosophy, for it has unique features of its own.

Brentano could meet this challenge to some degree, but not entirely. First of all, he might reply, there is a degree of community among philosophers. This occurs not only through spontaneous friendship, but also in formal meetings such as philosophical congresses. (Admittedly the purpose of such meetings is only to further knowledge, the first of Professor Thompson's three characteristics.) But second, Brentano would continue, philosophy as he conceives of it would have considerable practical implications. These could be looked on as service of the deity, the third of Professor Thompson's characteristics of religion.

There remains devotion, the second of these characteristics. It would be difficult to deny that worship, individual and/or communal, is an essential part of religion. Yet it would be equally difficult to maintain that worship is an inherent part of philosophy, even on Brentano's characterization of wisdom. Brentano has little to say about worship, and when he does speak of prayer and public assembly, he usually suggests that the priests of a religion would spend their efforts

more profitably if they were to encourage morality among
the adherents of the religion.[80]

This section, it can be said in summary, has indicated
the approach which Brentano takes in his theistic arguments,
and has shown that their results provide the norm for his
definition of "religion." Thus the normative aspect of the
definition does not arise out of its phenomenological nature.
It was then noted how, in Brentano's eyes, philosophy and
religion are alike and how they differ.

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[80]Brentano, *Religion und Philosophie*, p. 12.

VII. BRENTANO'S CONCEPT OF GOD

One of the central concepts in the philosophy of religion, of course, has been the concept of God. The present chapter will discuss Franz Brentano's theology as it is to be found in *Religion und Philosophy*. The discussion will begin with a brief systematic characterization of the concept of God which is present in Brentano's mind as he writes the various essays collected in this book. Then the discussion will turn to the major issue of God's knowledge of the world. Aristotle's concept of God will first be examined, and the question will be asked, what consequences follow from a denial of divine knowledge of the world? Then two philosophers who take affirmative positions on this issue will be mentioned. The views of Aquinas and Whitehead will be compared and contrasted with Brentano's position, in terms of the question of how temporality is related to a doctrine of divine knowledge of the world. Finally, Sartre's phenomenologically developed atheism will be examined.

1. Metaphysical Attributes of God

The reader of *Religion und Philosophie* will find that there are interspersed throughout the book brief indications of Brentano's concept of God. It may be useful to collect these various elements and order them under several basic topics. This will produce a composite account of Brentano's metaphysically oriented doctrine of God.

The most basic element in this doctrine, and one which is mentioned quite often in this work, is that God is a necessary being.[1] This doctrine is supplemented by Brentano's essay "The Necessity of God," in which he argues that God as the immediately necessary being is not his own cause (causa sui), but rather is, without being caused.[2]

The next element in Brentano's theology which should be mentioned, if the analysis is to proceed in a logically-ordered sequence, is how God the necessary being is related to the world. There are several themes to be noted. First, Brentano often speaks of God as the "first cause" or "first ground" of the world.[3] Second, he also calls God the "creator" of the world, and concomitantly with this the "orderer" of the world.[4] Third, Brentano also refers to God at points as he who rules or governs the world.[5]

Another major theme in Brentano's concept of God is that of perfection. Throughout the book one finds numerous references to God as the "infinitely perfect being."[6] Even

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[1]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, pp. 16, 17, 36, 95, 110.

[2]Ibid., pp. 126-130; cf. also p. 110.

[3]Ibid., pp. 16, 17, 29, 72.

[4]Ibid., pp. 29, 36.

[5]Ibid., pp. 11, 107.

[6]Ibid., pp. 17, 18, 36, 107; cf. p. 95.

a reader who agrees with Brentano in principle could object to this formulation on the grounds that perfection does not admit of degrees. Brentano might have responded to such an objection either by acknowledging that the adverb in his locution was added for emphasis, or that it indicates that there are various considerations, in terms of each of which God is perfect. Or, and perhaps most likely, Brentano might have responded that goodness is an element in perfection, and it does admit of degrees. Accordingly, Brentano also speaks of God as being the realization of infinite good,[7] an absolutely good being.[8]

Finally, it should be mentioned that Brentano conceives of God as a personal being,[9] who is spirit (or, "mind," Geist).[10]

The reader of Religion und Philosophie will note that not only are these elements in Brentano's doctrine of God sown throughout the book, but also some of these elements are elaborated in particular essays in Part Two.

2. Divine Mind Thinking Itself: Aristotle

A phenomenologist could study with great interest

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[7]Ibid., p. 20.

[8]Ibid., p. 95.

[9]Ibid., p. 36.

[10]Ibid., p. 110.

Aristotle's concept of God, noting both points of similarity with his own view and points of departure. The relevant passage in the Aristotelian corpus is to be found in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics.[11]

The reader of the Metaphysics will first notice several areas of agreement between Aristotle's views and the characterization of thought to be found in Religion und Philosophie, which has already been explicated. First, Aristotle does make the distinction between an act of thinking and the object of thought.[12] Second, he also recognizes the importance of an object of thought to (waking) consciousness. Thought thinking of nothing is like sleep, he states.[13] Third, Aristotle recognizes that when an act of consciousness has something else for an object, it is also concomitantly aware of itself.[14]

Aristotle and Brentano would agree that God thinks, but they differ on the question of what is appropriate as the object of God's thought. Aristotle proceeds in one direction, which appears to generate a serious problem. It will be shown later that Brentano proceeds in a different direction which

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[11]Aristotle, Metaphysics, Lambda (XII), Chapter 9, in McKeon, op. cit., pp. 884-885.

[12]Ibid., 1074b 38, p. 885.

[13]Ibid., 1074b 17, p. 884.

[14]Ibid., 1074b 35-36, p. 885.

avoids this difficulty.

Aristotle's position appears to be that God thinks only of himself. However, he seems to express this view in two different ways which are not exactly the same, at least verbally. On the one hand, Aristotle has distinguished the act of thinking and the object of thought. In terms of this distinction, he says that in the case of divine thought its thinking is a thinking on thinking.[15] Putting this in other words, he states that the divine thought thinks of itself.[16] That is to say, the act of thinking takes itself as the object of thought. On the other hand, Aristotle also states in the same chapter that in the case of things which have no matter (and God, who is pure actuality, does not have any matter, which is the principle of potentiality), thought and the object of thought are not different. Thus the divine thinking is one with the object of thought. These are probably two ways of saying the same thing, such that the former way of stating the case acknowledges an analytical distinction, but that the latter means of expression denies a real difference.

Aristotle's doctrine that God thinks only his own thought is a teaching which is attended with two difficulties. The

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[15]Ibid., 1074b 34-35, p. 885.

[16]Ibid., 1074b 33-34, p. 885.

lesser problem derives from the principle which apparently has led him to this position. His intention is to be that of maintaining the perfection of God. Aristotle endeavors to preserve this divine perfection, it seems, by restricting God's knowledge to that which is worthy of him. The argument would appear to be formulated as follows: Divine thought thinks of the most excellent things (exclusively); divine thought itself is the most excellent of things; therefore divine thought thinks of itself (exclusively).[17] The problem with this approach is that it makes God entirely ignorant of the world, and it is rather difficult to reconcile this total ignorance with divine perfection, which is Aristotle's starting point.

Aristotle tries to meet this shortcoming of his argument by claiming that there are some things which it is better not to see than to see.[18] Still this does not seem to be adequate. Ignorance may be better than error, but it is not better than knowledge. This would be so a fortiori for Aristotle, who places such a high value on knowledge, elsewhere in the Metaphysics and in the Nicomachean Ethics as well.[19]

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[17]Ibid., 1074b 33-35, p. 885.

[18]Ibid., 1074b 32-33, p. 885.

[19]Ibid., Alpha (I), Chapter 1, in McKeon, op. cit., pp. 689-691, and Nicomachean Ethics, VI, in McKeon, op. cit., pp. 1022-1036.

Furthermore, if there is any good to be found in the world, it would not be consistent with the perfection God that he should remain ignorant of it.

The greater difficulty in Aristotle's doctrine derives from what appears to be a faulty step in his analysis of the nature of reflexion. The analysis begins correctly, in making the distinction between the act of thinking and the object of thought, in asserting that this divine act of thinking must have an object of thought, and in acknowledging that there is a concomitant knowledge of self accompanying the act of thinking an object of thought. Up to this point the analysis is sound, and the error enters in at the point Aristotle denies any object of thought apart from the thinking self. This step turns reflexion into circularity. It produces a vacuity in which there is no thought at all.

The weakness in Aristotle's analysis can be seen through comparison with the Sartrean account of reflexion. This is a phenomenological analysis which incorporates and elaborates Brentano's earlier insights that consciousness is always consciousness of an object, and that consciousness of an object is accompanied by a concomitant consciousness of self. The analysis, as developed by Sartre, involves three elements.[20]

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[20] Jean Paul Sartre, *Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness*, trans. by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday Press, 1957), pp. 31-60.

These are the object of consciousness, the reflected cons-
ciousness, and the reflecting consciousness.

(c) reflecting $\rightarrow$ (b) reflected $\rightarrow$ (c) object of
    consciousness   consciousness   consciousness

In the initial situation, there is an awareness of an object
of consciousness which is other than the self. Together with
this, there is also a non-thetic awareness of the self. Now
in the derivative situation of reflexion, the reflecting
consciousness has as its object the reflected consciousness,
which is a consciousness of an object.

This analysis of reflexion identifies the point at which
Aristotle's account of divine thought went wrong. Aristotle
denies that divine thought has for an object anything other
than itself, and thus eliminates element (a) in reflexion.
But since consciousness must have an object, there can be no
consciousness (b). Now since consciousness must have an
object, there can be no reflecting consciousness (c) without
a reflected consciousness (b). Thus the whole act of reflexion
is obliterated, like an hypothetical syllogism **modus** **tollens**:

$$b \supset a$$
$$c \supset b$$
$$\underline{\sim a} \qquad /\therefore \sim c$$

The result is vacuity, not divine thought contemplating itself.

Brentano's philosophy of religion is so structured that
it is not susceptible to either of these weaknesses in
Aristotle's concept of God. Brentano holds that God is cons-
cious of the world. The precise manner in which God knows

the world, for Brentano, will be explicated in the next section. It is sufficient at this point to note that since the world is other than God, the divine act of thought has an object of thought other than itself. Therefore it is not circular, and neither is it vacuous. There still can be divine self-awareness, of course. A non-thetic self-consciousness would accompany divine consciousness of the world, and in thetic reflexion the reflecting consciousness would have as its object the reflected consciousness, which would be consciousness of the world.

Besides avoiding this major difficulty in Aristotle's concept of God, Brentano's formulation also escapes the minor difficulty as well. For Aristotle, God does not think the world. This ignorance of the world is difficult to reconcile with divine perfection. For Brentano, God does know the world, and is not subject to the liability of cosmic ignorance. Furthermore, the world which God knows is a good world; in fact it is the best of all possible worlds.[21]

It should explicitly be mentioned that this preceding discussion has been analytic. Brentano himself did not argue in such a manner. In fact, he believed that Aristotle, like himself, held that God does know the world.[22] The present

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[21]_Infra._

[22]Franz Brentano, _Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung des Menschlichen Geistes_ (Leipzig: Von Veit, 1911), pp. 133-41.

discussion however has followed the account of Aristotle's theology given by Professor Ross, who holds that Brentano's interpretation was incorrect and Aristotle denied that God knows the world.[23] Likewise the phenomenological account of refelxion derived from Sartre does not represent his own concept of God. Sartre instead holds that God is "the impossibility of man," being a combination of the incompatible elements of nothingness (l'être pour soi) and being (l'être en soi).[24] Thus the discussion is entirely analytic, and should be understood as such.

3.   Divine Mind Thinking the World: Aquinas

The previous section contrasted the theologies of Aristotle and Brentano on the issue of whether God has the world as an object of thought. As Hartshorne and Reese's analysis shows, Aristotle's position has not been held very frequently in the history of philosophical theology, but various formulations which combine knowledge of the world with eternal consciousness have been held far more frequently.[25] This

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[23]W. D. Ross, review of Aristotles Lehre vom Ursprung des Menschlichen Geistes, by Franz Brentano, in Mind, XXIII (April, 1914), 291, and idem, Aristotle, University Paperbacks (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1964), pp. 179-86.

[24]William Earle "Man as the Impossibility of God" in William Earle et al., Christianity and Existentialism (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 94-95.

[25]Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 16-17.

means, of course, that Brentano's position was not unique in escaping the difficulties from which Aristotle's view suffered.

As further reference to Hartshorne and Reese will disclose, there are different kinds of theological positions which incorporate a doctrine of divine knowledge of the world. Thomas Aquinas represents one of these positions, which the authors term "classical theism."[26] Alfred North Whitehead represents another, which they term "panentheism."[27] It will be noted that one way in which these positions differ is the issue of temporality in the divine consciousness. There is a connection between this temporality and the way in which God knows the world, as will be seen. This section will show how Brentano's position stands intermediate in this respect between Aquinas and Whitehead, anticipating process theology in one important regard.

Thomas Aquinas' account of how God knows the world is to be found in Question 14 of the First Part of the Summa Theologica.[28] Two interesting aspects of his position should be noted: How God knows the world, and how the temporality of

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Thomas Aquinas, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. by Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945), I, 135-161.

the world is reflected in his knowledge of the world.

First, Aquinas does hold that God knows the world.[29] God knows himself, and in knowing himself he also knows everything of which he is the first effective cause.[30] He even knows evil things, although he is not their cause, because evil is the privation of good and God knows good things.[31]

Second, Aquinas holds that God's knowledge of the world is eternal, not temporal, even though he acknowledges that the world which God knows is temporal. In the questions preceding the present one on God's knowledge, Aquinas has argued that God is immutable[32] and eternal,[33] and he has stated that eternity includes all times.[34] Thus the groundwork has already been laid for denying that there can be temporal succession in the divine mind.

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[29]It should be noted that Aquinas, like Brentano, thought that Aristotle also believed that God knows the world. Aquinas argued this interpretation on the basis of Aristotle's criticism of Empedocles, who asserted that God did not know discord (De Anima I, 5 and Metaphysics III, 4).

[30]Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 14, a. 5, in Pegis, op. cit., pp. 141-142.

[31]Ibid., a. 10, pp. 149-150.

[32]Ibid., Q. 9, a. 1, pp. 70-71.

[33]Ibid., Q. 10, a. 2, p. 76.

[34]Ibid., ad 4, p. 77.

This latter assertion is explicitly made in the four-
teenth question. While denying that God's thought is in any
way discursive, Aquinas also states that there is no succes-
sion in the divine thought.[35] His reason for making this
assertion is that things are known successively if they are
known separately, but simultaneously if they are known in
one thing, and God knows all things in knowing himself.

Having argued that God is eternal and immutable, and
that God's thought is simultaneous rather than successive,
Aquinas is in a position to deny that God's knowledge of the
temporal world is itself temporal. Thus Aquinas specifically
states in the fifteenth article that God's knowledge is
invariable.[36] He states that God's knowledge is not variable,
but that God does have an (invariable) knowledge of what is
variable.

God in his eternity, Aquinas continues, has a knowledge
of whatever is or can be. Aquinas also states in this
article that it cannot be the case that anything existed
which God previously did not know, and afterwards came to
know. After one considers Brentano's position, which is to
be discussed presently, one will be able to see that there

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[35]Ibid., Q. 14, a. 7, pp. 145-146.

[36]Ibid., a. 15, pp. 158-160.

are actually two different issues in the matter of divine knowledge which have been fused together in this article: The question of temporality and the question of ignorance.

Aquinas also employs these same principles to argue that God knows future contingent things.[37] These things which become actual in time are known to men successively, but they are known to God simultaneously. His reason for saying this is that God is eternal, and eternity is the simultaneous whole which comprises all time. Aquinas contrasts man's temporal knowledge with God's eternal knowledge by means of the famous metaphor of the road. The traveller on the road does not see those who come after him, but the one who surveys the whole road from a height sees all the travellers on the road.[38]

In comparison with Aquinas' account of how God knows the world, the doctrine to be found in Brentano's Religion und Philosophie has some fundamental similarities and some interesting differences. The crucial issue is that of temporality.

The two philosophers are in agreement on some points. First, and rather obviously, each recognizes that time is a fundamental feature of the world which God knows. Events are ordered in a temporal sequence according to past, present and

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[38]Ibid.

future. Second, each thinker also holds that God's knowledge of an event is not restricted by the temporal sequence in which that event occurs. This view can be expressed in less rigorous terminology as stating that God knows future events. Yet the reason that this latter formulation is not quite so rigorous as the former, is that Aquinas and Brentano develop different doctrines precisely at this point.

Aquinas and Brentano differ on the question of whether there is a temporality in God corresponding to the temporality of the world. Aquinas denies that there is. He therefore holds that God, for whom all times are simultaneously present, knows events which are future contingent events for us, to whom various times are present successively. Brentano acknowledges that there is a temporality in God which corresponds to that of the world. For Brentano, then, God knows events which are future both to him and to us. Aquinas and Brentano agree, then, in affirming that God knows future events, but they disagree about whether this event which is future for man is also future for God.

4. Divine Mind Thinking the World: Brentano

Brentano's basic doctrine of how God knows the world is as follows:[39] Various events occur in time. A proposition comes to be true, and ceases to be true; the same proposition

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[39]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 111.

is not always true.[40]   A thousand years ago God foresaw

something to come in a thousand years.   Now he knows this

event is present.   In a thousand years he will know the

event as having occured a thousand years before.

This theological position could be considered an adum-

bration of process theology.   Brentano states that the divine

life is a continuity (Kontinuität), and in apposition with

this term, he refers to it as a process (Prozess).[41]   This

term "process" appears elsewhere in the book too,[42] and at

one point Brentano speaks of the "inner divine process."[43]

This process in God is "substantial" (substantiell), states

Brentano.[44]   Like Aquinas,[45] he denies that there are acci-

dents, or attributes (Eigenschaften) in God.[46]   Since there

is a process of change in God, it must therefore be a change

of substance, or essence (Wesen).[47]   Clearly Brentano differs

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[40]This is so, of course, only if the proposition does not
have a temporal qualification.   Cf. Aristotle's analysis of
"He is sitting," Categories V (4a 23), trans. by E. M. Edghill,
in McKeon, op. cit., p. 13.

[41]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 145.

[42]Ibid., p. 119.

[43]Ibid., p. 118.

[44]Ibid., p. 119.

[45]Aquinas, op. cit., I, Q. 3, a. 6, pp. 32-33.

[46]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 111.

[47]Ibid.

from Aquinas here, as the latter holds that God is immutable.[48]
Yet while acknowledging a substantial change in God, Brentano
hastens to affirm personal identity and to deny that one God
follows another in succession.[49]

This process in God is linked with the world. The various
moments of the divine process stand in relation to the various
determinations in the created world, states Brentano.[50] One
way in which the two are related is through God's knowledge
of the world, for God changes in knowing the changing world.[51]
Yet this change in God is not a transition from ignorance to
knowledge. Brentano affirms that God always has been omnis-
cient.[52] The change which occurs is a corresponding change
of knowing subject and known object. God knows the world.
The world changes, and God too changes. Therefore, God's
knowledge always corresponds to the world which he knows. A
thousand years ago God knew a given event as a future event.
The event is occurring now, and now God knows it as a present
event. In another thousand years God will know it as a past
event. Thus the corresponding changes in knowing subject and

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[48]Aquinas, op. cit., I, Q. 9, pp. 70-73.

[49]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 120.

[50]Ibid., p. 119.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Ibid., p. 118.

known object <u>preserve</u> the relationship of knowledge. They
do not either establish or destroy the relation. Brentano
combines the affirmation of a temporal process in God with the
denial of any ignorance in God's relationship with the world.
It was noted above that in Aquinas' treatment of the issue,
variability in the knower involves ignorance at some time.[53]

It might be noted, however, that Brentano's affirmation
of temporality in God does not extend to the question of
divine reasoning. Brentano denies that the mental act of
inferring (<u>Schliessen</u>) occurs in the divine process.[54] That
is, God does not arrive at new knowledge (the conclusion) from
other knowledge (the premises). On this point Brentano is in
agreement with Aquinas, who denies that there is discursive
knowledge in God.[55] God's knowledge is immediate, not dis-
cursive, for Aquinas.

5. <u>Divine Mind Thinking the World: Whitehead</u>

Since the foregoing remarks have suggested that Brentano's
concept of God anticipates process theology, it would be
interesting to compare and contrast his thought to that of

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[53]<u>Supra</u>.

[54]Brentano, <u>Religion und Philosophie</u>, p. 112.

[55]Aquinas, <u>op. cit.</u>, I, Q. 14, a. 7, pp. 145.

Alfred North Whitehead.[56] The source to be consulted is his

major book on metaphysics, Process and Reality.[57] In this

work Whitehead develops a "dipolar" conception of God.[58]

That is to say, God has a primordial nature and a consequent

nature.

One reason that Whitehead acknowledges a dipolarity in

God, it would appear, is that he understands God to be imma-

nent in the world (which is in flux) and the world immanent

in God.[59] The nature of each is a primordial datum for the

other.[60] Whitehead and Brentano would agree in rejecting a

separation of permanence from flux, which would assign the

former to God and relegate the latter to the world.[61] They

would further agree that in God's nature, flux is derivative

from the world.[62]

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[56]Comparison of different philosophers is often difficult
because each thinker has his own terms, corresponding to
various concepts unique to his system. Hence there are no
easy equivalents in the two philosophies.

[57]Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay
in Cosmology, Academic Library (New York: Harper, 1960).

[58]Ibid., p. 524.

[59]Ibid., p. 528.

[60]Ibid., p. 529.

[61]Ibid., p. 526.

[62]Ibid., p. 529.

Brentano's thought presents certain contrasts with what Whitehead designates as the primordial nature of God. This concept is described rather clearly at three different points in _Process_ _and_ _Reality._[63] According to those accounts, the primordial nature of God is his "envisagement" (or "conceptual recognition," or "conceptual valuation") of eternal objects. An eternal object, corresponding somewhat to a platonic idea, is an entity whose conceptual recognition does not necessarily involve a reference to any actual entity in the temporal world.[64] Brentano would differ at this point, since God knows not merely the form, but rather the specific individual event as a future event. There is some question whether the primordial nature of God is temporal.[65] If it is not, then Brentano would differ at this point too, since he holds that the event future for us is future for God too. Furthermore, there is also some question whether the primordial nature of God is conscious. One certainly would suppose this to be the case, for it is hard to see how there could be an unconscious entertainment of an idea. Yet certain passages in _Process_ _and_ _Reality_ suggest this interpretation.[66] Brentano rejects Augustine's argument for the existence of God, namely that

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[63]_Ibid._, pp. 46, 70, 521.

[64]_Ibid._, p. 70.

[65]Cf. _ibid._, p. 73.

[66]_Ibid._, pp. 521-522.

the existence of eternal truths requires the existence of an eternal mind in which they dwell.[67] The basis of his reasoning, however, is not that these eternal truths do not need an eternal mind, but rather that it cannot actually be said that they "are."[68] God's knowledge of an event, prior to its occurrence, is obviously a conscious knowledge for Brentano.

It is likewise interesting to compare and contrast Brentano's thought with what Whitehead characterizes as the consequent nature of God. This latter concept is also well characterized in Process and Reality.[69] It is his physical prehension of the actual entities (or "actualities") of the evolving universe. As has been suggested already, Brentano would certainly affirm that an occurence in the world process is refelcted in the divine process, and he would agree with Whitehead in this respect. He might have some misgivings about calling this a "novel element in God's objectification of /the7 actual world."[70] It would be novel in that the event is newly known as a past event, but it would not be novel in the sense that it was not previously known as a future event. Brentano would also object to Whitehead's characterization of the consequent nature of God as a

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[67]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 109.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Whitehead, op. cit., pp. 46, 134; cf. also pp. 527, 530.

[70]Ibid., p. 523.

"fulfilment" of the "deficiency" of the primordial nature of God.[71] The change which takes place in the divine process is not a transition from deficiency of knowledge to fulfilment, but rather the transition from knowledge of an event as future knowledge of the event as past.

The last three sections have compared and contrasted the views of Aquinas, Brentano and Whitehead on the question of how God knows the world. The crucial issue was seen to be that of temporality. The discussion proceeded in terms of the frames of reference used by these three philosophers in developing their views. Phenomenological considerations were not introduced. It would be interesting, however, to raise the question of whether phenomenology could develop a position on this issue. One could conceive of an argument somewhat as follows: Knowledge of an object is an act of consciousness. Consciousness is by its very nature a temporal process. Therefore knowledge of the world would be temporal in terms of the knowing consciousness as well as the known world. The development and evaluation of such a line of reasoning, however, is beyond the scope of this discussion.

6. The Impossibility of God: Sartre

This discussion has already drawn upon the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. His phenomenological insights have proved

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[71]Ibid., p. 530.

helpful to this point, but one should not assume that Sartre would be in agreement with the theistic position being maintained. Sartre is an atheist, and consequently one must consider how his atheism is related to his phenomenology.

Sartre's position is as follows. Man seeks to be God, but God is impossible. Thus he writes:

> The fundamental value which presides over this project is exactly the in-itself-for-itself, that is, the ideal of a consciousness which would be the foundation of its own being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it would have of itself. It is this ideal which can be called God. Thus the best way to conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the being whose project is to be God.[72]

Such a project, contends Sartre, can never be realized. It is contradictory, and therefore the existence of God is impossible.

The two fundamental categories in Sartre's ontology are the in-itself and the for-itself, being and nothingness. These are incompatible, for consciousness is not a thing. A thing is exactly what consciousness is not. Now, for Sartre, the word "God" means "the in-itself-for-itself." Since the in-itself and the for-itself are incompatible, however, God is impossible.

The best response to Sartre's argument is not to reject

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[72]Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 566.

his terms, but rather to accept them and carry them through

to their logical conclusion. The conjunction of an affirma-

tion and its negation is analytically a contradiction. This

however is precisely what Sartre understands to be the nature

of consciousness, given his categories. Consciousness conti-

nually negates itself. Otherwise it would become being,

which is not consciousness. Thus from his description of

God, within his system, he should arrive at the conclusion

that God is consciousness, not that God is impossible. Thus

Professor Earle writes of Sartre as follows:

> . . . he defines God as a contradiction;
> but we had just finished reading his
> defense of contradiction, in which he
> makes contradiction itself the very core
> of consciousness! The conclusion in
> school logic would be that God exists as
> consciousness, but Sartre's contention is
> that there is no such thing at all.[73]

Thus Sartre's categories are not inimical to a theism such as

Brentano develops. All that is necessary is that the correct

conclusion be drawn from the premises.

This chapter has sought to explicate Brentano's concept

of God. The discussion began with an analytical presentation

of the basic features in his theology, as they appear through-

out Religion und Philosophie. Following this, the discussion

turned to the issue of God's knowledge of the world. It was

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[73]Earle, op. cit., p. 107.

argued that Aristotle's position on the question, namely that
God does not know the world, involves some serious problems
in terms of a phenomenological analysis of how thought thinks
itself. Brentano escapes such problems by affirming that
God does know the world. The issue of temporality arose at
this point. Brentano's position was compared and contrasted
with the views of Aquinas, on the one hand, and Whitehead on
the other. The conclusion was that Brentano represents an
intermediate position which in some ways anticipates process
theology. Finally, it was shown that even if one accepts
Sartre's phenomenological analysis of the idea of God, still
one need not accept his conclusion of atheism.

VIII. AXIOLOGY, ESCHATOLOGY, THEODICY

The various topics of systematic theology are so inter-
related that an examination of any one theme will finally
involve a consideration of all the others. Professor Robert
McAfee Brown once spoke of the "theological circle" (not in
the Tillichian sense) in describing this inter-relationship
among the various topics of theology.[1] Wherever one starts
on the circle, he said, one will finally come to every other
point on the circle.

There is such a relationship between different aspects
of Franz Brentano's philosophy of religion. Consideration of
one theme leads one to other themes. This chapter will
examine in order three such aspects of his thought: Axiology,
eschatology, and theodicy.

1. Axiology

The Greek $\alpha\xi\iota\alpha$, meaning "worth," forms the root of
"axiology," which denotes the philosophical study of value.

As Professor Eaton has pointed out, one aspect of Brentano's
theory of consciousness forms the basis for his philosophy of
value.[2] This is his tri-partite division of mental activities.

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[1]Robert McAfee Brown, lecture in Systematic Theology 103,
"Introduction to Christian Theology," The Union Theological
Seminary in the City of New York, Fall S$_e$mester, 1960.

[2]Howard O. Eaton, The Austrian Philosophy of Values (Norman,
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1930), Chapter II.

The analysis appears in numerous places in Brentano's writings, sometimes with variations in terminology. One of these discussions appears in Part Four of Religion und Philosophie.[3]

According to Brentano's theory, there are three major categories of mental acts: 1) Representing (Vorstellen), 2) Judging (Urteilen), and 3) Interest (Interesse). In the first case, one thinks of something. This something is "represented" (vorgestellt), i.e., present to one's mind. In the second case, it is judged (beurteilt). As a judgment may be affirmative or negative, the thing may be either acknowledged (anerkannt) or rejected (verworfen). In the third case, it is accompanied with interest (Interesse). Since this too is either positive or negative, one can speak of the general categories of love and hate. It is this latter category of mental acts which involves value, and is important to Brentano's axiology.

One will note that this tri-partition of mental activity already presupposes Brentano's principle of the intentionality of consciousness. There must be an object of consciousness in each case. One does not simply represent, one represents something. Likewise one does not merely judge, one judges something. Similarly, again, one cannot have an interest without its being an interest in something.

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[3]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, pp. 191-192.

These categories of mental acts have certain relationships to one another. The act of representing is fundamental, since there cannot be a judgment without prior representation. This act of representing is also fundamental to the third type of conscious act, since one cannot have an interest in something without thinking of it. The second and third categories are alike too, in that both judging and interest can be either positive or negative, while representation does not have this dual aspect. Although these several categories of mental acts do have relationships to one another, Brentano also explicitly remarks that none of these categories can be derived from either of the others.[4]

The previous discussion of Brentano's epistemology noted that, according to this theory, it is evidence (_Evidenz_) which characterizes a judgment as correct.[5] Furthermore, it has just been noted that interest is like judgment in that each can be either positive or negative. When one considers these two principles, one is led to inquire whether there could be "correct" and "incorrect" interest as analogous cases to correct and incorrect judgment. One could ask, further, whether there could be an evidential basis for correct interest as there is for correct judgment. What one would be asking, then, is whether the basic principles of Brentano's

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[4]_Ibid._, p. 192.

[5]_Supra._

epistemology could carry over to his axiology as well.

The answer to this question is affirmative. Franz Brentano delivered an address to the Vienna Law Society in 1889. This lecture, which was subsequently published and which has been translated into English under the title "The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong," contains many important aspects of Brentano's ethics.[6] In this lecture he states that the categories of judgment and interest are alike in that a mental act can be right or wrong in either case.[7] Brentano goes on to say that there can be a right love, and that which is loved with such a right love is the good.[8] Further on in the lecture he also remarks that there can be a right preferring in the choice of a greater good over a lesser good.[9] Brentano also makes the connection between epistemology and axiology in the distinction between blind judgments and self-evident judgments.[10] Just as this is the case with judgments, so too there is an analogous distinction

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[6]Franz Brentano, The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, trans. by Cecil Hague (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1902).

[7]Ibid., p. 15.

[8]Ibid., p. 16.

[9]Ibid., p. 23.

[10]Ibid., pp. 17-20.

between blind pleasure and self-evident pleasure. What this means, apparently, is that a person can blindly prefer something, or can prefer something with a self-evident knowledge that one is preferring rightly.

If one is already aware of this aspect of Brentano's axiology, one can find slight intimations of it throughout Religion und Philosophie. At one point he remarks that a man's pain is evil in the eyes of each person who judges correctly (eines jeden richtig Urteilenden).[11] Elsewhere in the book he speaks of the need for an analogue to insightful judging, and of the need for evidence (Evidenz).[12] At still another place in Religion und Philosophie, Brentano speaks of the difference between the blind emotions (blinde Affekte) or an incorrect emotion (eine unrichtige Gemütsbewegung), on the one hand and correct love (die als richtig charakteristierte Liebe) on the other hand.[13]

One must also consult Brentano's lecture "The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong" in order to identify the theoretical basis for his concept of sin. In this lecture he dealt with the topic of choice among values.[14] The basis of choice, in current terminology, is that of axiological grading.

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[11]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 155.

[12]Ibid., p. 170.

[13]Ibid., p. 143.

[14]Brentano, The Origin, pp. 21-33.

Some things are "good", and others are "better" he notes.
To say that one good is "better" than another means that this
one good is preferable, i.e., is preferred with "a right
preference."[15]

This value theory is the basis for Brentano's concept of
sin, as it appears in _Religion und Philosophie_. Sin, he
states, is to neglect what is known to be better for what is
known to be less good.[16] The basis of sin, then, is incorrect
choice, accompanied by the knowledge that this choice is
incorrect. One cannot sin unknowingly. Brentano remarks
elsewhere in the book that when a person wills what is evil,
he still loves a good, even though it is a lesser good than
some other.[17] The fault is that the person does not love the
greater good more than the lesser good (and consequently
choose it instead, one would add).

It is customary in systematic theology to make a dis-
tinction between the metaphysical attributes of God, on the
one hand, and the moral attributes of God on the other.[18]
In keeping with this distinction, the metaphysical attributes
of God have already been discussed, and now there remains to
be mentioned the moral nature of God. This distinction might

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[15]_Ibid._, p. 23.

[16]Brentano, _Religion und Philosophie_, p. 164.

[17]_Ibid._, p. 174.

[18]Walter Marshall Horton, _Christian Theology: An Ecumenical Approach_ (New York: Harper, 1955), p. 86.

be useful as an analytical tool for discursive thought, but one should remember that Brentano denies that God is a composite of essence and attributes.[19]

Brentano's axiology is the foundation for his characterization of the moral nature of God. God is endowed with moral knowledge and moral volition.[20] God loves all good, and prefers the most preferable (bevorzugt das Vorzüglichste).[21] What God does is the best of all possible goods.[22] It is clear then that Brentano's concept of the moral nature of God is based upon the principle that values are graded as good, better, and best. Sin, for Brentano, is the knowing choice of the lesser good instead of the greater good. Since God is sinless, he always chooses the best known good. And since God also possesses full knowledge, he chooses the best absolutely. Thus, to anticipate a theme discussed in the following section, the world which God creates is the best possible world, since God would not choose the lesser good instead of the greater.[23]

2. Eschatology

Eschatology, a branch of systematic theology, is the

[19]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 111.

[20]Ibid., p. 142.

[21]Ibid., p. 111.

[22]Ibid., p. 120.

[23]Infra.

study of "last things" ($\tau\alpha$ $\overset{)}{\epsilon}\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\alpha$). Two aspects of Brentano's philosophy are included in this category. One is the concept of immortality, and the other is conception of the course of world development.

Part Four of Religion und Philosophie deals with the concept of immortality, although in a rather oblique way.[24] The two issues with which this part of the book deals directly are first the relationship between the physical and the mental,[25] and second the subject of mental activity.[26] Each of these is one perspective or another on what is called today "the mind-body problem."

Brentano's method of procedure in these pages is to examine the various possible positions on the issue at hand, and to note their respective strengths and weaknesses (especially the latter). It is thus an informal kind of disjunctive argument.

Brentano's conclusions are that the brain is an organ of consciousness, but not its subject. The subject of consciousness, he states, is a mental (or "spiritual", geistig) substance. What Brentano means by his phrase "the spirituality...of the human soul" (die Geistigkeit...der menschlichen Seele) in the title of Part Four is that the soul is

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[24]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, pp. 187-249.

[25]Ibid., pp. 187-216.

[26]Ibid., pp. 217-249.

a non-dimensional substance. This to be contrasted with matter, which in Cartesian terms is an extended thing (res extensa).

The conclusions of Brentano's treatment of the mind-body problem do have implications for his concept of immortality. If the results had been that the brain is the subject of mental activity, then a doctrine of immortality could not be held.[27] Since Brentano has concluded, however, that the subject of mental activities is a spiritual substance, he can find considerable warrant for his doctrine of immortality. It is in this way that Part Four deals, although obliquely, with immortality.

It appears that for Brentano the chief importance of the doctrine of immortality is its role as a sanction of morality. Again and again in Religion und Philosophie, Brentano draws the connection between moral action in this life and one's destiny in the life to come.[28] By the law of just recompense (vergeltende Gerechtigkeit), a man's good or evil deeds in this life will have appropriate consequences in the next life.

This doctrine does have certain merit. As Brentano points out, the conviction of a just recompense can give a person

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[27]This conclusion probably would not rule out altogether a doctrine of resurrection, in contradistinction to a doctrine of immortality.

[28]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, pp. 12, 19-22, 36.

support in time of temptation, and can strengthen his impulse to noble action.[29]

However, this doctrine also has some considerable short-comings. First, it is liable to the danger of a crass self-interest.[30] We know the natural laws of this world, and although we cannot change them, we can work within these laws for our own benefit. Likewise by knowing the law of just recompense, we can provide for our welfare in the next life as well. Second, this doctrine tends to misdirect the focus of morality, which Brentano himself has tried to sanction by the very same concept. Given that at least a very significant part of morality is the relationship between my present action and the welfare of another person in this life, Brentano's doctrine would tend to redirect the focus of morality away from the other person's welfare in this life, to my own welfare in the next life. This would result in a false orientation of morality.

One should note in this regard that Immanuel Kant, while holding a somewhat similar view of retribution and reward, specifically disallowed such calculating provision for one's welfare in the next life. In his work _Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone_, Kant distinguished between those who

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[29]_Ibid._, p. 20.

[30]_Ibid._, p. 19, but cf. p. 97.

do their duty for the sake of the reward (in the next life) and those who perform their duty for its own sake.[31] He called the former a refined self-interest, and indicated that it would not have the same consequences as the latter kind of behavior.[32] There are major differences between Brentano and Kant, to be sure, but they share some principles of a retribution and reward theory of morals. Kant's remark shows that such enlightened self-interest is highly questionable even within this framework.

The topic of eschatology includes, of course, a consideration of the anticipated future development of the world. Brentano has a very definite opinion on this issue. The future of the world is that of an endless progressive development.[33]

Brentano's concept of perfection allows him such an anticipation of endless progress. Perfection is not removed from the present by a finite distance, which can be traversed in a finite time, it appears. Perfection seems instead to be more like a horizon which continues to recede as the person moves forward. Yet this does not mean continual frustration,

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[31]Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1960), p. 149.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Brentano, Religion und Philosophie, p. 56.

for there are finite degrees of perfection which can be attained and surpassed _en_ _route_. The future of the world, for Brentano, is infinite progress, exceeding every finite stage of perfection, yet with infinite perfection always ahead and never attained.[34] This development has a beginning, but no end.[35]

One could inquire what such a doctrine might be called. One term sometimes used is "meliorism," denoting the view that the world is becoming better and better (the word _melior_ in Latin means "better"). However, Brentano uses this term with a different meaning, as will be seen presently.[36] Another candidate is the term "optimism," which is sometimes used to indicate an anticipation that the future will be better, and not worse than the present. However, Brentano also uses this word with a different meaning.[37] There remains one other term, which indeed was very popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This term of course is "evolution." In fact, Brentano refers to this progress of the world as an endlessly proceeding evolution (_eine_ _ins_ _Endlose_ _gehende_ _Evolution_).[38] Thus Brentano's view could be called an evolutionary eschatology.

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[34]_Ibid._, p. 110.

[35]_Ibid._, p. 166.

[36]_Infra_.

[37]_Infra_, _loc._ _cit._

[38]Brentano, _Religion_ _und_ _Philosophie_, p. 178.

One objection which might be brought against Brentano's eschatology could be phrased as follows: Is it not possible, or perhaps even inevitable, that in the future history of the solar system some astronomical occurrence might take place such that life in the solar system would come to an end? Brentano was well aware of such possibilities.[39] His reply to such a criticism would be that the history of the world (Weltgeschichte) is not the history of the earth (Erd-geschichte).[40] Life on earth may perish, but the history of the world would continue in a process of endless perfecting. Such a reply, or course, presupposes a doctrine of immortality.

The other criticism which might be brought against Brentano's doctrine of eternal progression is that it contra-dicts his doctrine that this is the best possible world. If the world is to progress, it must advance from the present state to a better state. But if it does so, this is not the best possible world. There is a better possible world, namely the one to which the world will presently advance. Brentano was aware of this criticism, but his answer is not entirely convincing. He holds that the world now is the best world possible now. Any other world which existed in its place at present would be an inferior configuration.[41] At any given

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[39]Ibid., p. 37.

[40]Ibid., p. 72.

[41]Ibid., pp. 179-180.

time in the future, too, the world which will exist then will
be the best possible world at that time.

3. Theodicy

The word "theodicy" derives from the Greek words $\theta\epsilon o\varsigma$
("God") and $\delta\iota\kappa\eta$ ("justice"). Accordingly, the problem of
theodicy in the philosophy of religion is that of reconciling
the presence of evil in the world with the justice of God.
Such an etymological definition is not entirely adequate,
however, since it suggests a rather superficial solution to
its own problem. Evil, on this etymological approach, could
be justified as God's just punishment for man's guilt. (The
word "   " was a legal term in ancient Greek usage.) Such
a solution is too simple, however, for it ignores two problems.
One difficulty is that guilt and evil (as punishment) do not
seem to be very well correlated in this life. The other prob-
lem is how a God who is perfectly good could create such a
world where evil is present at all, for whatever reason. It
is these difficulties which create the real problem of
theodicy.

Franz Brentano was well aware of the problem of evil in
the world. At one point in Part Three of Religion und
Philosophie he gives an enormously eloquent picture of the
multitude of evils in the world, and even argues that evil
"preponderates" (überwiegt), i.e., outweighs the good in the

world.[42] The context of this presentation is in fact
Brentano's account of pejorism, a view which he rejects.
Thus it is another illustration of how explicitly and elo-
quently he can present another view than his own. However,
Brentano's refutation of pejorism does not involve a denial
that evil exists in the world, and even outweighs the good,
as will be seen. Thus his eloquent presentation can stand
as an acknowledgment of the existence of evil. Elsewhere
Brentano has also noted that the appearance (Anblick, not
Schein) of evil in the world, and the unjust distribution of
good to the righteous and unrighteous, can bewilder a person
and lead him to deny the existence of God.[43]

Besides the presence of evil in the world, the other
basic element in the problem of theodicy is the goodness of
God. Brentano conceives of God as the infinitely perfect
being, as has been noted, and describes God as always pre-
ferring the better to the less good. At one point (in
another context) he uses Anselm's formula to describe God as
"the being than which no other being can be thought to be
more perfect."[44]

The elements which together constitute the problem

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[42]Ibid., pp. 170-173.

[43]Ibid., p. 21.

[44]Ibid., p. 176. Cf. Anselm, Proslogium, Chapters II and
III in Basic Writings, trans. by S. N. Deane (La Salle,
Illinois: Open Court, 1962).

of theodicy are thus to be found in Brentano's thought. How can the presence of evil in the world be reconciled with the moral perfection of God? Franz Brentano's theodicy actually contains a number of themes, all of which are oriented toward one major principle. This principle--that this is the best of all possible worlds--will be presented first, and then the various subsidiary themes will be taken up one by one.

Brentano's basic principle of theodicy, as has been mentioned, is that this is the best of all possible worlds. This principle is reminiscent of Leibniz, of course.[45] Its function in theodicy is to exculpate God by showing that any other possible world would be inferior to the one which exists, and thus God has realized the highest attainable good. One line of attack for an attempted refutation of this theodicy would be to show that there is a better possible world, of course. The way to accomplish this would be to argue that some given aspect of the world which one might consider evil could be eliminated without the consequent loss of a greater good.

It would be interesting to note Brentano's terminology in this argument, since there is some danger of ambiguity in important terms. In ordinary English usage, "optimism" means

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[45]G/ottfried7 W/ilhelm7 Leibniz, Theodicy, trans. by E. M. Huggard, and ed. by Austin Farrer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 377-378.

the tendency to look at things in the best possible light and to anticipate a positive outcome of events. "Pessimism" is used to denote the tendency to look at things in the worst possible light, and to expect a negative outcome. These words also have more technical meanings. Brentano frequently uses three terms: "optimism," "meliorism," and "pejorism." The first of these, for him, is the doctrine that this is the best possible world. Meliorism is the doctrine that the existence of the world is preferable to its non-existence, and pejorism is the contrasting doctrine that the non-existence of the world would be preferable to its existence. Brentano uses the word "meliorism" with this meaning, and it has already been noted that the word also has another technical meaning, namely that the world is progressively becoming better and better. All of these terms have Latin roots: optimus, "best"; melior, "better"; peior, "worse"; and pessimus, "worst."

One interesting feature of Brentano's optimism is his emphasis not only on the maximum quantity of good in the world, but also on its distribution. For this to be the best possible world, its goodness must be distributed justly. Thus Brentano criticizes the philosophical position of utilitarianism for computing the world's goodness only as the sum of pleasure less the sum of pain.[46] Since this formula ignores the

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[46] Brentano, _Religion und Philosophie_, p. 153.

distribution of the good, it would make the two following cases equal in goodness: In one world pleasure would fall to the lot of the virtuous, and pain to the evil; in the other world, pain would fall to the lot of virtuous and pleasure to the evil.

Finally, one will note that, for Brentano, the doctrine of optimism (in the technical sense) follows from the doctrine of God.[47] This is easily understood, for if God is morally perfect, then he will choose the greater good over the lesser good in each case. And if this is so, then the world which he created will be the best possible world.

It was mentioned that in addition to this central principle, there are also other themes in the totality of Brentano's theodicy. One of these is the argument that what we designate as evil is not altogether evil, but also contains some good.[48] Error, for example, is an evil. Yet it contains some good.[49] In order for one to err, one must first represent (vorstellen), and then judge (urteilen). The act of representing in itself is good, and it is only the subsequent act of judging erroneously that is bad.

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[47]Ibid., pp. 18, 60, 70.

[48]Ibid., pp. 157, 162, 173.

[49]Ibid., p. 174.

Brentano's argument carries some force. This kind of reasoning in general is sufficient to prove meliorism (as Brentano understands it) over against pejorism. Since error involves some good as well as evil, it is better than the state of unconsciousness, in which there would be no erroneous judging, but there would not be any representing either. This line of argumentation is not adequate to prove optimism, however. One can think of a __better__ situation, namely one in which a person represents and then judges __correctly__.

Another theme in Brentano's theodicy is that of compensation in a future life.[50] If the righteous man suffers in this life--and Brentano seems to acknowledge the possibility--then this suffering will be compensated for in the next life. God has ordered the world in terms of laws of just recompense (__die Gesetze vergeltender Gerechtigkeit__).

This argument too has some appeal, but neither is it entirely convincing. Suppose a critic were to propose an alternate world in which the righteous man did not suffer in the first place. One could reply that such a world governed by the law of just recompense is at least no worse than a world in which the evil did not occur at all, for this is precisely what it means to say that the evil is compensated for. Still, however, the evil did occur in the first place, and compensation can only only make up for this evil, and not

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[50]__Ibid__., pp. 19-22, 95.

retroactively bring about its never having happened.

There is yet another line of reasoning to be found in Brentano's theodicy. This is the argument in terms of the whole and the part.[51] According to this argument, when God wills the best possible, this will is directed to the whole, and not the part. It is the world which is the best possible, and not every particular constituent part of the world. The implication of this view, of course, is that a situation which is evil from the perspective of one individual may in fact be indispensable for the world to be the best possible world, and thus actually be good and not evil.

This argument also has some plausibility, for it would be irresponsible to pass judgment on a particular situation without knowing all its consequences, as Brentano himself remarks.[52]

Still, the argument from the part and whole is attended with two problems. First, it seems to mitigate the force of another of his arguments, if not refute it altogether. If it is the whole, and not the part, that is the proper focus of theodicy, how then can Brentano criticize the utilitarians for merely calculating the excess of pleasure over pain, and not concerning themselves with the just distribution of pleasure and pain? Second, this argument from whole and part

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[51]Ibid., pp. 177-178, 181, 183.

[52]Ibid., p. 166.

is subject to being met by another hypothetical case.
Conceive of another situation, the argument would run, in
which a given situation were good for a particular part, and
good for the whole as well. Would this not be a better world
than the ostensibly best of all possible worlds in which a
given situation which was bad for a particular individual were
nevertheless good for the whole?

It appears then that Brentano's theodicy is subject to
a rather insistent form of criticism which would propose,
in any given case, that another configuration of the world
were possible in which the evil in question could be eliminated
without the loss of a greater good.

This chapter has touched upon three final topics in
Brentano's philosophy of religion: his theory of value, his
views on immortality, and his justification of the ways of God
to man. What now remains in this analysis is to examine
Brentano's philosophy from an explicitly stated contemporary
perspective--secular theology. This will be done in the next
chapter.

IX. THE PERSPECTIVE OF A SECULAR THEOLOGY

The preceding eight chapters have examined Franz Brentano's philosophy of religion in terms of its own structural coherence, and in relation to its position in the history of philosophical and religious thought. Some fifty years have passed since Brentano wrote the last of his essays in _Religion und Philosophie_, and thus it would be appropriate also to examine his thought from the standpoint of the present philosophical and theological scene. All that has gone before in this study has contributed to the total scholarly appraisal of his philosophy of religion, and this concluding chapter will add one final element to that appraisal. No examination of a past work can be complete without taking into account how that philosophy might be viewed today.

Accordingly, this chapter will undertake to criticize Franz Brentano's philosophy of religion from the standpoint of a secular theology. As the discussion proceeds, there will be stated certain reasons why this perspective does constitute a suitable basis for criticism. It should be remembered that a complete criticism points out both good features and bad features in a work under study. Thus the present chapter will endeavor to indicate what are both the strengths and weaknesses of Brentano's position, from the vantage point of a secular theology.

It will be seen that the distinction between immanence

and transcendence is a helpful pair of categories in the evaluation of Brentano's philosophy of religion. In terms of this distinction, Brentano's thought will appear to be a valuable philosophical resource for the development of themes of divine immanence, but not in the elaboration of a doctrine of divine transcendence.

As the analysis proceeds, it will be observed that doctrines of divine transcendence are accompanied by serious problems relating to experience and meaning, and thus are not auspicious prospects for the present-day theologian. Certain conceptions of divine immanence, however, seem to be quite promising directions for theological development. These speak of God in terms of value, and thus the thinker whose theology is so oriented can find Brentano's philosophy to be an invaluable resource for his own work.

The perspective of this final evaluatory essay, therefore, is that of an axiologically oriented secular theology. The writer is most dubious about the hopes for any theological discourse about the transcendence of God, but he is quite sanguine in his anticipations of significant discourse about the immanence of God, especially in terms of value. Thus the essay naturally divides itself into two sections with knowledge and value respectively.

1. Knowledge

The word "meaning" itself has many meanings. One of these

is fundamentally cognitional in nature, and another is basically axiological. In this first sense of the word, a meaningful statement is one which is intelligible or understandable. In the second sense, a meaningful event is one which is significant or valuable. The first of these two senses of the word is the one relevant to the present discussion, the other will be of use subsequently.

Meaning and experience are related in the case of synthetic propositions. Such a statement is meaningful if it refers to experience. The degree to which it is meaningful depends upon the extent to which it refers to experience. This meaning is at least cognitional in nature, although an axiological meaning may also be present. The basic feature to be noted here is that meaningful (synthetic) statements are those which reference to experience has made intelligible.

An additional feature of the theory of meaning, which is often overlooked, should be made explicit here. This is the feature of personal reference. A statement which is meaningful is always meaningful to someone. Meaning does not inhere in the proposition alone, for if understanding is to come about, there must be a person who understands as well as a proposition which is understood. Thus if a given synthetic proposition is to be meaningful to any given person (or community of persons), then it must refer to his (or their) experience.

This theory of meaning has certain implications for religious discourse. First, any person writing a theology

will need to be aware that he is writing <u>his</u> theology, and what makes it his theology is the fact that it is based on his own experience. Accordingly, he may be somewhat cautious in making claims about the universal and absolute validity of his theological formulations. Second, when two persons discuss or debate theology, they will have to recognize that each is presenting his own theology, which is based on his own range of experience. This may introduce a note of humility which surely would help preserve amicable personal relations between the protagonists, and may also further the search for truth. Third, when two persons find themselves in disagreement over a question of theology, they may discover that one party in the discussion lacks a certain kind of experience upon which the other party has been drawing for his conclusions. If so, then the cause of the disagreement has been found, and the way the discussion could be resolved would be for the first party to come to have the experience which the second party already has had. Fourth, if the two protagonists do find themselves in agreement over the range of experience upon which they are drawing, then their attention could be turned to the inductive and/or deductive processes of reasoning by which each has proceeded from his experience to his theology.

The concept of experience is useful in characterizing the two terms "immanent" and "transcendent" as they are used in theological discourse. To say that God is immanent in the

world is to say that God is an actual or potential object of human experience. To say that God is transcendent of the world is to say that God is beyond human experience.

These two terms may be applied one or both to God. The classical pantheist would assert the immanence of God but deny his transcendence. The classical deist, on the contrary, would say that God transcends the world, but would refrain from saying that God is immanent in the world. A theologian could also assert both the immanence and transcendence of God, on the grounds that our experience of God does not comprehend the totality of God.

From what has been said thus far, the secular theologian is led to conclude that theology must limit itself to speaking of the immanence of God, and cannot extend itself to discourse about the transcendence of God. A cognitionally meaningful synthetic proposition is one which refers to experience. The immanence of God is the divine presence in human experience. Thus meaningful statements can be made about the immanence of God. The transcendence of God is the divine as beyond experience. Accordingly no meaningful statements can be made about the transcendence of God.

Accordingly, secular theology should not be characterized as atheistic, but rather agnostic. It is not atheistic, because it does not claim that God does not exist. Rather, it is agnostic in saying that the theologian is not in a position

to make any statements about the transcendence of God.

One objection which could be brought against this theory is that even though the theologian must begin with the range of his own experience, he still can proceed beyond this experience. Franz Brentano would probably take this line of argument if he were to reappear in the current philosophical scene. He would most likely argue that if the theologian rightly considers the existence and nature of the world, he will be able to come to some conclusions about the Creator of the world. The objection could also be cast in another form (which, however, Brentano probably would not choose), as stating that the theologian who begins with his experience of the immanence of God can thereupon proceed to the transcendence of God.

The secular theologian would respond by saying that discourse about the transcendence of God actually makes use of many terms and concepts drawn from our experience. This discourse is intelligible to the extent that it employs such terms. The problem arises when a theologian then applies these terms to what is beyond experience. Here the element of unintelligibility enters.

The secular theologian holds intellectual caution to be a prime virtue, and thus will himself want to avoid overstating his case. Not only is he unwilling to deny the existence of God, as would an atheist, but he is also unwilling to say that terms and categories drawn from our experience do

not apply to what is beyond our experience. He wants to say instead simply that we are in no position to make statements about what is beyond our experience, and thus are unable to say whether they do or do not apply (univocally or analogically). So far as our discourse is to be meaningful, it must be restricted to the realm of our experience.

The secular theologian finds that he must also defend his position from a possible challenge by the neo-orthodox theologian. The latter would object that secular theology commits a fundamental error in making reference to human experience. The focus of theology, he would say, instead should be the divine initiative of incarnation, to which revelation the scriptures bear witness.

The secular theologian could respond to this challenge by observing that even if God did reveal himself in the incarnation, as the neo-orthodox claims, still theological knowledge of this would have to be derived ex hypothesi from the experience which the early church had of Jesus of Nazareth that led these early Christians to claim that he was the Christ. Thus scripture would still be a reflection on experience.

The secular theologian would probably wish to continue his analysis in this direction beyond the initial reply to the neo-orthodox theologian. He would further note that whereas the first-generation Christian may very well have had an experience of God incarnate in his midst, as the neo-orthodox

and right-wing liberals would assert, still the very
Einmaligkeit of the incarnation means that the Christian of
a subsequent generation (whether he be a nineteenth century
Dane or a twentieth century American) cannot have such an
experience. In addition, the secular theologian could very
well have some doubts about whether he could ever be in a
position to compare the early Christians' experience with
their conclusions about their experience, and thus validate
their reasoning for himself. These doubts would be raised
by the neo-orthodox theologians themselves, who deny that
there is any uninterpreted picture of Jesus to be found in
the New Testament, asserting instead that there are only
theological interpretations. Thus the secular theologian
would refuse to assert, on the grounds of insufficient
evidence, that he can derive from Jesus of Nazareth any sound
knowledge of the transcendence of God.

Potential critics would be well advised not to condemn
the secular theologian for lacking faith. If they did, they
would be putting themselves in the unenviable position of
characterizing faith as the process of drawing conclusions from
inadequate evidence. The secular theologian will be able to
present a sounder conception of faith (infra), in terms of
which he can characterize himself as a being of faith.

The secular theologian would characterize "liberal
theology" as being theology which would assert human reason is

adequate to attain knowledge of at the transcendence of God, but he would also shift sides to the left-wing liberal and deny that such knowledge of divine transcendence is possible through any uniquely revelatory personal presence in first-century C.E. Palestine. Thus the secular theologian would consistently maintain the position that there is no sound argument leading to knowledge of the transcendence of God.

A critic might object at this point that the secular theologian has failed to come to terms with the Bible, and that this failure is a fatal mistake. The secular theologian could reply that he does take account of the Bible. It is a collection of the religious literature of two communities, ancient Israel and the early Christian church which ultimately broke off from it, he would reply. The New Testament is particularly valuable to the secular theologian because it is the record of the earliest century of that historical continuity which extends to the present, and of which he is a twentieth-century member. He would only deny that this historical document is also an epistemological norm for his own theologizing.

What remains for the secular theologian, who has at this point denied the present actuality if not the theoretical possibility of knowledge of the transcendence of God, is now to address himself to the question of how knowledge of the immanence of God is possible.

The philosopher of religion will discover, nonetheless,

that there is a problem to be solved at this point. How
does one know that this experience is the immanence of God?
One has the experience, and there is no theoretical problem
in discoursing about it. But the problem arises in how one
determines that God is immanent in this experience.

The solution to this problem lies to a great extent (but
not entirely) in the discovery that this question comes from
another frame of reference which the secular theologian has
already rejected. This would become clear if the initial
question were asked in different, although equivalent, terms.
Of all our human experience, how do you determine which is
secular and which is sacred? When the question is asked in
these terms, it immediately becomes clear that the interro-
gator is functioning in reference to a distinction between
secular and sacred, such that some experience is secular and
other is sacred. Now it is precisely this distinction which
the secular theologian refuses to recognize. This is one of
two reasons why the secular theologian bears the name he does.

The critic might then defend his distinction by saying
that sacred experience is that in which a transcendent God has
become immanent, and secular experience is that in which a
transcendent God has not become immanent. Here again the secular
theologian would remark that his critic is making use of
premises which have already been rejected. The criticism
presupposes that there is knowledge of the transcendence of

God. This again is what the secular theologian has already denied. For this reason as well, he bears the name of secular theologian.

This exchange between the critic and secular philosopher has been quite helpful for two reasons. First, it has shown that certain aspects of the criticism are unwarranted, having been derived from rejected premises. Second, the exchange has also identified legitimate demands which the secular theologian must meet. How does the secular theologian justify the selection of his subject matter as being appropriate material for the theologian to study? How does the secular theologian justify his speaking of this subject matter in terms of the immanence of God?

2. Value

As the secular theologian of the twentieth century looks back upon the history of theology in past centuries, he observes two kinds of statements, which are nevertheless inter-related. The one kind of statement refers to what is beyond human experience; the other kind of statement is concerned with what is in our experience. These two kinds of statements are not independent of one another, but are instead closely connected. A prime example of this is the inter-relation between Christology and soteriology in orthodox Chirstian theology. The first kind of statement is exemplified by Christology, which refers beyond human experience

to the Trinity. The second kind of statement finds exempli-
fication in soteriology, which refers to a style (or "quality")
of life. The two are inter-connected, for, in orthodox
language, Christ is savior. It should be noted parentheti-
cally that the distinction in fact is not always quite so
neat as the secular theologian's analysis, for the simple
reason that the theologians of earlier centuries were not so
concerned with what the secular theologian today considers
a crucial issue.

The secular theologian writing in the twentieth century
realizes that of these two kinds of statements traditionally
made by theologians, one may no longer be made, but the other
may. For reasons already discussed, he refrains from making
assertions which go beyond the range of experience. He does
consider himself in a position to make statements about what
is in our experience, however. Thus the secular theologian
will discontinue one of the two traditional tasks of theology,
but continue the other. This also means, one will note, that
the further task of showing relationships between the two will
disappear.

The obvious question at this point is, precisely what is
the nature of the task which remains? It could not be a study
of the totality of experience, for this is to be parceled out
to the various departments of the university--biology, history,
etc. Nor is it a synoptic view of the coherence of experience,

for this is the role of philosophy (at least in the view of some philosophers).

The question can be answered by consulting once more the two kinds of functions which theology has traditionally performed. The first has been concerned largely with being, the second primarily with value. Here again the analysis makes a more clean-cut division than the subject matter allows, and for the same reason as before. Since it is the second of the two roles which remains for the present-day theologian, it follows that his task will be essentially axiological in nature. This subject matter is quite suitable material for his endeavors, since value is by its very nature part of human experience.

This analysis has produced an answer to the question of what is the appropriate subject matter for the secular theologian. It is value.

Value, it will be recalled, is the second sense of the word "meaning." An event is meaningful, in this sense of the word, if it is related to a person's values. Since value is also part of a person's experience, the secular theologian is assured that his discourse meets both the cognitional and axiological criteria of meaning.

It will be recalled that the secular theologian sees the uniqueness of his position to lie in two points. First, he does not distinguish between the two realms of the sacred and the secular. They are coincident, so that everything sacred

is secular, and everything secular is sacred. Second, he
does not go beyond the scope of human experience. Value as
a subject matter fits these two categories quite well. It
is one _aspect_ of human experience, but not one _segment_. That
is to say, value includes the whole of human experience, from
one perspective. Thus value can meet the first requirement
because it is coextensive with the range of human experience,
so that there is no discrimination between sacred and secular
realms. Furthermore, value can meet the second requirement,
as already suggested, because it is within the scope of human
experience.

The fact that the secular theologian stands within an
historical tradition also explains why he refers to his subject
matter as the immanence of God. The reason is not that this
material has some unique relation to the transcendence of God,
since the secular theologian refrains from discourse about
the latter. Instead, the reason is that the secular theolo-
gian appropriates as his function too the second of the two
traditional roles of the theologian. In the present context
of discussion, these would be discourse primarily related to
the transcendence of God, and that primarily related to the
immanence of God. Accordingly the secular theologian will
continue to speak of value as the immanence of God, although
he will refrain from any endeavor to relate this to the
transcendence of God, concerning which he does not speak.

It is in this realm of value that Franz Brentano's philosophy can be of considerable assistance to the secular theologian. The relevant resources have already been described at the appropriate places in the preceding discussion, and need only to be recapitualted here.

First, it has already been observed that Brentano develops a three-fold categorization of mental acts: Representing, Judging and Interest. This third category of "interest" makes a place for value in the total range of mental acts. Especially if it is noted that whatever the mind represents can be entertained with interest, the secular theologian will have in the category of value a subject matter which can be an aspect of every human experience. This will enable him to maintain that the sacred is not a separate area of experience from the secular, but instead is the whole of experience from one perspective, namely the axiological perspective.

Second, Brentano's phenomenology of belief can be amended to admit a further element in the phenomenology of value. It has already been noted that Brentano's analysis is adequate to account for belief in the existence of an object which in fact does not exist in the manner believed. The same basic structure could be preserved in a phenomenology of valuation. Thus one could value something which in fact does not exist in the way desired. This would be the situation of an

"unrealized value." It is a common situation in human experience, and is the structure of such traditional theological concepts as sanctification and the kingdom of God.

The centrality of the concept of value in secular theology makes possible a more adequate concept of faith than would otherwise be possible. It has been noted that Brentano did not acknowledge that man has any direct experience of God. Yet Brentano did hold that man could know the existence of God. It has also been remarked that Brentano recognized that belief in the existence of God can have significant implications for the conduct of one's life. Now if one looks upon this combination of belief in the existence of God and its implications for a man's life as a concept of faith, one can make three remarks about Brentano's doctrine of faith. First, Brentano has shown that what a man believes can make a difference in his life. Second, he has demonstrated enormous theological dexterity in describing a faith which can have a significant role in the life of a man who has no direct experience of God. Third, this doctrine of faith, although it has its merits, is inferior to a concept of faith in which a man <u>does</u> have experience of God, and this experience has profound implications for the whole of his life.

The secular theologian can develop such a doctrine of faith in an axiological framework. First, he would say, man does have an experience of the immanence of God. This comes

about through the presence of value in his life. Secondly, the secular theologian would also observe that the experience of God does have great implications for the way a man lives. The reason is that it is precisely value which gives direction to a man's life and determines all its constituent volitions. Thus the secular theologian is able to give an account of faith such that man does have an experience of the immanence of God, and that this experience permeates his entire life. Faith could thus be defined as the total orientation of a man's life, based upon his experience of God. Such a concept of faith is possible for the secular theologian who works in an axiological framework.

As has been clear throughout this study, Brentano was most interested in ethics. His concern is reflected in contemporary secular theology which is axiologically oriented. Study of value is essential to ethics, since the triad of value includes the Good (i.e., the morally Good) as well as the Beautiful and the True. Furthermore, ethics is linked to religion, since axiology is the basis for theology in the thought of the secular Christian.

It has already been noted that Brentano has no real appreciation of worship, but rather emphasized ethics instead. The secular theologian would criticize this as being a false dichotomy. Since the immanence of God is known in the experience of value, the spheres of worship and ethics are coincident. Worship involves man's grateful acknowledgement of the presence

of God and consequently man's dedication to God. Ethics involves man's recognition of realized and potential good, and his devotion to the goal of realizing the latter. Thus worship and ethics do not constitute a distinction between sabbath and week-day for the secular Christian. They are simply two perspectives, theological and axiological, both looking upon the same reality.

The secular theologian is also capable of developing a doctrine of the church in terms of the experience of value. Traditional theology has always seen the church as a community of men whose ultimate allegiance is to God. The secular theologian accepts this characterization, and interprets it axiologically. The church is a community of men who have dedicated themselves to God who is immanent in our world. Their faithfulness is shown in the unity of worship and ethics, as value becomes their life orientation. Their aim is not merely to acquire the good for themselves or for the social group to which they belong. The church has never seen any great merit in such circumscribed goals. Their intention is to realize the good absolutely, that is, for all men regardless of who they are. Thus the Christian has to condemn the attitude expressed in Stephen Decatur's famous toast: "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong." Such an attitude shows that one's allegiance belongs first to the nation and only secondarily to God. The secular theologian looks

upon it as a case of inverted priorities. For him, the Christian owes his allegiance first to God, and thus cannot dedicate himself to working for any purpose which is inconsistent with the maximum possible realization of value for the whole.

An axiologically oriented secular theology would have to challenge one principle of value judgment which is implicit in Brentano's thought and explicit, interestingly enough, in current situation ethics. It should be noted, however, that this one point of disagreement is to be found within the larger context of appreciative agreement, as has already become clear in the case of Brentano's thought.

Brentano's theodicy has been criticized already on the basis of an axiological principle which the secular theologian would accept and incorporate into his system.[1] Brentano had argued that at any given time, the best world possible at that time does exist. This view was challenged throughout the discussion on the grounds that a better world is conceivable in each given circumstance, and thus should be possible for an omnipotent deity.

The same conceptual framework is found in discussions of situation ethics. Professor Fletcher rejects the doctrine of the "excusable evil."[2] There are certain situations wherein

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[1]<u>Supra</u>

[2]Joseph Fletcher, <u>Situation Ethics: The New Morality</u> (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), pp. 64-65.

a man performs, out of the motive of love, certain acts which he would not do in other circumstances. These could be called excusable evils. Fletcher does not question the appellation "excusable," he challenges the word "evil." What love commands one to do can never be evil, he holds. Here again the axiologically oriented secular theologian would respond that a better alternative is conceivable, and thus the excusable evil cannot be called good without qualification.

The position which is argued here distinguishes between actions considered in themselves and actions possible in a given set of circumstances. If three actions were examined each in isolation, the first might be judged unqualifiedly good, the second bad, and the third worse than the second. Now in a given set of circumstances the moral agent might find that the first course of action is not open to him, and thus he has to choose between the second and third courses of action. In such a situation he might choose the second, and do so out of love. This action could be called "the lesser of two evils", or an "excusable evil." It could be called good without qualification however, because taken in isolation from the given situation it would be seen to be inferior to another action which is good without qualification. This analysis applies whether the moral agent is man or God, and accordingly stands as a challenge both to Fletcher's situation ethics and Brentano's theodicy.

Before the secular theologian can rest his case, however,

there are two challenges of a more general nature to which
he must respond.

The first of these challenges is, "What right do you have
to call yourself a Christian?" This could better be phrased,
"What right do you have to call yourself a Jew, Christian, or
Muslim?" (as the case may be). The secular theologian might
be a member of either religious tradition.

The reply to this challenge is implicit in what has
already been said. The secular theologian recognizes the worth
of an ideal which has always been present in his religious
tradition, namely selfless dedication to the good. Therefore,
the secular theologian wishes to stand within this tradition
and appropriate its ideal for himself. Furthermore, he realizes
that he can more effectively work for the actualization of
good in the present situation through his membership in this
community. Thus he would ask of the theistically oriented
Jews, Christians, or Muslims that they allow sufficient
diversity of viewpoint within their respective communities so
as to include secular theology too.

The secular theologian could also be asked, "How are you
different from the irreligious man?" His response would be
first to point out that he is a member of the religious
community, which the irreligious man is not, and that he uses
the vocabulary of the community, which the irreligious does
not. The secular theologian would then hasten to say that
what is crucially important is whether a man is dedicated to

the selfless realization of the good. If an irreligious man is not, then he and the secular theologian are miles apart. But it is also possible for a man outside the synagogue or church to love the good with all his heart and soul and mind and strength. If he does, he and the secular theologian are one in spirit.

CONCLUSION

The preface to this study of one aspect of Franz Brentano's philosophy indicated the purpose and the thesis of this work, and mentioned briefly the approach which would be followed in examining his philosophy of religion. Now that the discussion has been carried through, it might be interesting in retrospect to enumerate the principles which have constituted the basis of this analysis, and to show just how they have been applied in the critique.

1. In some instances of philosophical writing, each of several themes may be touched upon in numerous places. This is especially the case with _Religion und Philosophie_, since it is a collection of various essays. The original editors of the German work made a classification of the essays. Yet there still remained the task of collecting the scattered remarks into various categories. This discussion has undertaken to organize Brentano's statements under several basic headings, such as religious belief, doctrine of God, theodicy, etc.

2. In order for a philosophical system to be entirely adequate, more is required than that the system simply be free from internal contradiction. It must also be coherent. This is the case with Brentano's philosophy of religion, and the discussion has undertaken to show how the various aspects of his thought are mutually implicatory such that they together

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constitute a coherent system. An example of this is the way Brentano's axiology is related to his theodicy, as has been noted.

3. The explication of terminology is very important not only for purposes of communication, but also for the precision of a concept. This discussion has sought to inquire to what extent Brentano has a fixed set of _termini technici_, to indicate precisely what he has in mind when he uses certain potentially problematic terms such as "science" (_Wissenschaft_), and to define exactly what he means when he employs certain common words for the purposes of philosophical analysis, such as "certainty" (_Sicherheit_) and "certitude" (_Gewissheit_).

4. Whether or not the philosopher can dwell in the mansion which he has erected, it is still the case that a philosophical system is written by a philosopher who lives a life. Thus it might be interesting in any given situation to examine how the man's life forms a background to his thought. Still, one would want to guard against what might be called "the biographical fallacy," namely, that the incidents in a man's life and not the operation of his reflective intelligence can adequately account for why he holds the beliefs he does. Thus there can be two kinds of answer to the question, What was the basis of Brentano's belief in the existence of God? One kind of answer is that Brentano was reared in a

religious home. The other kind of answer is that Brentano reflected upon the facts of experience and concluded from them that there must be a primal explanatory ground to the world, which is God. These two answers are different in kind, and one does not preclude the other.

5. The analysis of a philosophers thought requires the critic to decide what is important and what is not in the man's thought, and hence what should be stressed and what neglected. Various critics may differ on this question, and what the present author has considered as criteria of what is important are mentioned below. All should agree, however, that if a man's philosophy is to be evaluated as a system of thought and not merely as a single principle standing in isolation, then some care must be taken to see how adequately the philosophy can speak to each of the major issues in the field. In the case of Brentano's writings, one would have to ask whether his philosophy of religion had anything to say on each of the several major issues, such as the definition of "religion," the problem of epistemology, the nature of God, etc.

6. One criterion for what is important in a man's thought is the consideration of history. If a man contributed significantly to the subsequent course of thought, then critics must take account of the way he did so. The present author considers that Brentano influenced the course of later

philosophy primarily by giving to phenomenology his account of the nature of consciousness. Accordingly, the discussion has endeavored to show in outline how Brentano's key principles were to reappear in Husserl's thought.

7. If a man such as Brentano is to be looked upon as the fore-runner of a movement, the historian of philosophy must not expect to find more than anticipations of later features of the movement. Thus one task of an analysis such as this has been to show how certain aspects of Brentano's thought, such as his account of belief, can be understood to fit into the phenomenological framework.

8. When one examines the total thought of a man who is the fore-runner of some movement, one must not expect to find an adumbration of the movement in every aspect of his thought. Accordingly, the present writer has not tried to misconstrue Brentano's thought so as to appear that it foreshadows phenomenology in every respect. Brentano's contribution to later phenomenology came from his philosophy of mind, as has been noted, and not from his philosophy of religion.

9. The author considers that the major contribution which phenomenology has made to philosophical insight is its characterization of consciousness as intentionality. Yet its very nature limits phenomenology to a study of the relationship of mind to an object, and thus the method cannot give knowledge about the nature of the world in and of itself. Still,

phenomenology can provide assurance of the separate existence of the world. The basis for this is the fact of embodiment. The body is in the world and is perceived to be one of many objects in the world. The body is also the means by which consciousness can intend certain objects, namely perpetual objects. Thus the world is established through the intermediation of the body. Although phenomenology can thus establish the world as existing separately, it cannot describe the world as it is in itself; therefore other disciplines are necessary too. Thus a phenomenology of religion can yield valuable insight, but other approaches to religion are also legitimate and necessary.

10. The history of philosophy shows that there are various alternative positions which have been taken on the basic issues with which philosophy is concerned. It is often interesting and informative to relate a man's thought to this spectrum of viewpoints. Accordingly, this study has set out several classical positions on the issue of whether (and if so, how) God knows the world. Brentano's theology was compared and contrasted with the views of Aristotle, Aquinas and Whitehead. Brentano's views on this issue were found to be an adumbration of process thought.

11. Different philosophies need not be in conflict at every point, and the critic of a given thinker will want to note possible areas of rapprochement with other viewpoints.

Thus it was noted in studying Brentano's concept of God that phenomenology could be a useful means for developing many of the concepts which are usually thought to belong to the domain of process theology. It was suggested that further investigations along certain of these lines might prove to be quite rewarding.

12. Another criterion for which of those aspects of a man's thought that a critic might select for attention is the criterion of novelty. Even when a thinker devotes considerable time to a given topic, the critic will want to give this discussion only passing notice if he is merely recapitulating lines of reasoning which have been explored at great length by others before him. It is for this reason that Brentano's theistic arguments have not been discussed at length here.

13. Positive content is another requirement for an interesting and informative philosophical discussion. The disjunctive argument, although formally valid, is an approach of lesser value than some other forms of reasoning, since the philosopher employing it devotes the major part of his effort to the task of refuting wrong positions, rather than explicating the correct viewpoint. It is for this reason that the present analysis did not dwell at length upon Brentano's study of the relation of body to mind (soul).

14. In some cases a philosophical system will depend

upon one or two basic premises. Given these premises, the philosopher will proceed to erect what can be a very interesting, informative, coherent and extensive system of thought. One approach of philosophical criticism of course is to concentrate on those basic premises. If they can be refuted, then the whole system falls, and there is no reason for the critic actually to address himself to the system itself. This approach has certain merits, of course, and can be applied to Brentano's philosophy of religion. His system rather obviously rests upon the premises of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Nevertheless, the present study has not taken this approach. Instead, the present author has preferred to grant Brentano his premises for the sake of the analysis, and then to examine precisely what he does with them. This seems to have been a preferable approach, because it has enabled the critic to discover an enormously rich system of thought.

15. It would be a mistake to suppose in advance that the philosophical issue in question at any given time is always correctly formulated, and that the critical task is therefore simply to examine how a philosopher deals with the issue. The present writer has argued that the question of how philosophy and religion are related must be recast as the question of how a given philosophy is related to religion. The question should also specify which religion or theological

position within a religion is under discussion, if this is
not already evident. Neo-Platonism, for example, would have
a different relation to Hinduism or Buddhism than it would
have to Christianity.

16.   The critic of a philosophical work will want to
note the obvious objections which might present themselves
to the reader of the work, and he will furthermore go on to
inquire whether the philosophy in question has the necessary
resources to meet these objections. This critical task will
at once be imaginative, for the writer must think his way into
the philosophical system and speak from that standpoint, and
it will also be a disciplined task, since the critic will
not want to excogitate lines of response which have no foun-
dation in what the philosopher has written. This study of
Brentano's thought has repeatedly employed such a method of
criticism, as for example,in the question of why religion
should have any value whatever if it is only "ersatz-philosophy."

17.   The historian of philosophy will also be interested
in seeing whether subsequent developments in philosophy might
have some direct bearing upon the arguments and analyses of
an earlier thinker. It is the case here that subsequent
developments in the philosophy of formal deductive systems do
have bearing on how we evaluate Newton's methodology, and
Brentano used Newton's procedure as paradigmatic for his
epistemology.

18. There is some limited use for reference to the facts of experience in a philosophical critique. One function of philosophy is to account for the facts of experience, and different philosophical systems may all account for these facts, each in a different way. If so, these facts themselves are not crucial points for deciding against one system and for another. Still, if a philosophy does not take into account a given fact of experience at all, then the critic can point this out. Accordingly, this study observed that Brentano ignores the fact of worship in his theory of how religion and philosophy are related.

19. One can ask whether there are any logical lacunae in the system, in the sense of possible superior alternate formulations which it overlooks. Brentano's theodicy has been criticized here on the basis of overlooked alternative configurations which preserve the good and still eliminate the evil in any given situation.

20. Finally, a philosophy written a generation or more ago can be examined from the standpoint of an explicitly stated contemporary position. Accordingly, Brentano's philosophy of religion has been criticized from the prespective of secular theology. It was found that, from this point of view, Brentano's thought has been least significant in so far as it involved the theme of divine transcendence, and most profitable to the philosopher developing a theology of divine immanence.

In this latter regard, Brentano's insights into the nature of value were most rewarding.

In summary, these twenty principles constitute the foundation upon which this account of Brentano's philosophy of religion has been based. As has become clear through their enumeration, the critique involves a certain understanding of the nature of a philosophical system and certain perspectives on the scope and adequacy of various philosophical systems.

The enumeration of principles therefore provides the structure in terms of which the author has endeavored to argue his thesis, namely that Franz Brentano developed a coherent philosophy of religion which was to a certain degree phenomenological in nature.

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